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INTRODUCTION 
It is becoming more apparent with each passing political upheaval that the Internet is 
playing a continuously more vital role both in the ways in which political confrontations 
are communicated locally and globally as well as in the outcome and the course of events 
before, during and after.  As the recent situation in Iran poignantly illustrated, the Internet 
has been and is continuing to develop into a force to be reckoned with.  As is the case in 
many totalitarian countries throughout the world, it is becoming more difficult for the 
Cuban government to maintain and propagate its dominant discourse model as Cuban 
citizens are overcoming substantial technological barriers, dialing in, and contributing to 
a more unbiased understanding of life in Cuba.  Cuban bloggers are ignoring the potential 
ramifications of dissenting against the Cuban government and are writing about life in 
Cuba today.  While a blogger in a liberal democratic country may freely partake in 
political discussions, bloggers in countries such as China, Iran, and Cuba are 
extraordinary in their determination to share their lived realities with the world despite 
limited access to the Internet, government censorship of certain websites, and fear of 
repercussions.  The Cuban bloggers covered in this paper are exceptional because they 
are part of a very small yet well organized group of individuals with a very clear 
directive: to fight with words for the freedom of expression.  In this paper I will deal 
specifically with the ways in which Cuban bloggers are contesting state sanctioned modes	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of civic participation and censorship.  Other questions I address herein include the 
following: In what ways are the Cuban bloggers contesting the discourse model of liberty 
and freedom espoused by the government?  What role does the Cuban education system 
play both in perpetuating a “master discourse model” and in influencing or encouraging 
individuals such as the Cuban bloggers to be cognizant of alternate discourse models?  
How are Cuban bloggers and their understanding of their own realities being influenced 
by cyber-activists internationally?   
This issue is of great importance in an increasingly internetworked world and as 
of yet there has been very little academic work done on Cuban bloggers specifically.  
With the recent media and governmental focus on the use of the Internet in people’s 
movements and with special attention going towards social networking sites like Twitter, 
Facebook, and MySpace, there is bound to be a surge in research projects around 
cyberactivism.  While Cuba’s A-list blogger Yoani Sánchez is drawing international 
acclaim through various awards and honors, the Cuban blogging movement has yet to 
result in or be part of either a national upheaval or a government crackdown - unlike the 
election fraud protests that sent thousands of Iranians in to the streets.  I speculate that 
this lack of political luster makes this movement less appealing to a drama-craving 
society.  Through this research I have found that one of the most challenging components 
of writing a research paper on contemporary issues, and specifically on active bloggers, is 
that every day there is new and pertinent information.  I have chosen to use the 
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aggregator website Voces Cubanas as my port of entry into the Cuban blogging world 
and will discuss the site in more depth below. 
The thesis is divided into three parts; 1. Preliminary information including 
Methodology and Cyberactivism, 2. Discourse Models of the Cuban State, and 3. 
Discourse Models of the Cuban Bloggers. I will begin the methodology portion of this 
thesis, with an overview of James Gee’s discourse analyses through and examination of 
dominant and alternative discourse models and their interactions.  In this section I will 
also discuss the Internet in Cuba as a carefully regulated instrument of the State and the 
ways Cubans are overcoming technological obstacles to dialing in.  I follow this with a 
section on global cyberactivism paying special attention to Iran and China as those 
governments have enacted similar restrictions and their citizens overcome similar 
obstacles as those of the government and citizens of Cuba.   
In Part 2 I delve into Fidel Castro’s use of language in creating a discourse model 
that, while aligned with his vision of an ideal Cuban society, is increasingly disparate 
from the lived reality of Cubans.  I also provide historical and theoretical foundations of 
the dominant Cuban discourse models.  In Part 3 in sections on participation and 
education, and the dual economy I look at the ways in which Cuban policy has been 
driven by and sought to reproduce Castro’s master discourse model.  Education is an 
instrumental component of producing civic participation in any country but possibly 
more so in a country such as Cuba where the education system is praised internationally 
for its success in achieving 100% literacy and gender parity, among other 
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accomplishments.  Meanwhile there is a growing disparity between the ideas propagated 
by the state and the actions the state has taken to counter the economic turmoil in which 
the country finds itself.  
Fidel Castro has often referred to ideas as Cuba’s most powerful weapon.  
Language has been one of the primary tools of the regime and it is only natural that a 
well-organized and overt dissent movement would also utilize the tool of language.  In 
Part 4 of the thesis I will discuss what I have come to think of as the Cuban blogger 
movement and particularly the way two Cuban bloggers, Yoani Sánchez and Claudia 
Cadelo, are writing about and responding to the current situation in Cuba.  I will use the 
website Voces Cubanas as my primary port of entry to the Cuban blogging world.  While 
this particular website houses only a handful of the growing number of Cuban bloggers it 
is important in that it is an aggregator site housed off-island which joins many dissenting 
voices together in a more powerful show of solidarity.  Following a discussion of Voces 
Cubanas I will deal in depth with the blogs of Sánchez and Cadelo from the month of 
June, 2009.  I have divided their blogs by topic and organized those discussions to repeat 
the order of the themes of the preceding section.
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PART I 
 
SETTING THE STAGE 
 
 Methodology 
In carrying out this research I rely on James Gee’s An Introduction to Discourse 
Analysis (2005).1  Gee’s discourse analysis deals specifically with the ways that language 
is “recruited ‘on site’”.  He discusses the importance of discourse models in how we 
understand the way people are communicating and the ways in which they share their 
lived experiences.  He argues that in order to truly understand a given statement we must 
also understand the discourse model that has given rise to that statement.  Gee writes that 
“discourse models are ‘storylines’, families of connected images, or (informal) ‘theories’ 
shared by people belonging to specific social or cultural groups”2; that language has 
situated meaning based on local knowledge and experience.  For example when someone 
with little knowledge of Cuba’s history hears Castro discussing the evils of imperialism 
that person will have a very different understanding of what he means than will someone 
who has been educated in Cuban schools.   
Gee discusses language as political and as a process by which “social goods are 
thought about, argued over, and distributed in society”.3  He distinguishes the particular 
form of discourse analysis he covers in his book by further describing it as “the analysis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gee, J.P. (2005). An Introduction to discourse analysis (2nd Ed.). New York: Routhledge. 
2 Gee, p. 95 
3 Ibid., p. 2 
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of language-in-use”4 and as neither “uniquely ‘right’” nor of his creation.  This type of 
discourse analysis focuses on the interactions between the mind, society, interactions, 
activities, and institutions and is therefore appropriate as a methodology for 
understanding the ways in which Cuban bloggers are contesting and, perhaps, 
transforming the rules of civic participation.   
Gee identifies three dominant types of discourse models: espoused models, 
evaluative models, and models-in-(inter)action.  The first is something we consciously 
perpetuate, the second can be unconscious but describes models through which we “judge 
ourselves or others”, and the third includes those models which guide our actions whether 
consciously or not.  He also describes ‘master models’ which refer to a dominant 
discourse model that has widespread impacts on social and experiential organization5 but 
which could also be any of the three above-mentioned model types.  Language has been a 
powerful tool during the Cuban Revolution6.  The regime’s use of language is deliberate 
and strategic and because of the centralized political, social, and economic structure of 
Cuban society, is pervasive.  This language, what Jan Kubik (1994)7 refers to as the 
“language of propaganda”, forms an integral component of Cuban curriculum, and of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid., p. 5 
5 Ibid., p. 83 
6 In Cuba the word ‘revolution’ has two meanings.  There was the Revolution during which Castro and his 
guerilleros overthrew the U.S.-backed Batista regime in 1958 and then there is the Revolution that has been 
ongoing ever since.  Throughout the rest of this paper when I use the world “la revolución” I am referring 
to the latter. 
7 Kubik, J. (1994). The power of symbols against the symbols of power: The rise of solidarity and the fall of 
state socialism in Poland. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 
7	  	  
	  
sanctioned music, movies and television programs.  Although Benigno E. Aguirre 
(2002)8 argues that this universal infusion of the language of propaganda has sapped 
Cubans’ ability to form and express critical opinions this paper shows that such a claim is 
invalid. 
Gee lists a number of important and relevant questions to ask when thinking of 
discourse models as tools of inquiry that prove useful when embarking on the task at 
hand.  
1. What Discourse models are relevant here?  What must I, as an analyst, assume 
that people feel, value, and believe, consciously or not, in order to talk (write), 
act, and/or interact this way?... 
2. …What other Discourse models are related to the ones most active here?  Are 
there “master models” at work? 
3. What sorts of texts, media, experiences, interactions, and/or institutions could 
have given rise to these Discourse models? 
4. How are the relevant Discourse models here helping to reproduce, transform, or 
create social, cultural, institutional, and/or political relationships?  What 
Discourses and Conversations are these Discourse models helping to reproduce, 
transform, or create?9  
 
These questions directly informed some of my earlier mentioned research 
questions and others have been useful in constructing a framework from which I might 
think about and analyze this particular issue.  It is important to keep in mind when 
endeavoring on a task such as this that every model is entangled with others and every 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Aguirre, B.E. (2002). Social control in Cuba. Latin American Politics and Society, 44(2),p. 67. 
 
9 Gee, p. 91. 
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individual experiences/understands the world through various models.  But the value of 
seeking to understand and define dominant and alternative discourse models remains 
worthwhile as it aids us in coming closer to an understanding of social and political 
interactions.  As Sujatha Fernandes (2007)10 writes: 
Discursive frameworks are shaped by the broader political and economic orders under 
which people live, but these frameworks can also be undermined, reworked, and 
overcome by counterhegemonic movements and orders. 
She goes on to write that as Cubans have both the tools necessary for analyzing the 
disparity between the discursive frameworks, or discourse models, and reality, and the 
ability (understood as freedom granted by the government) to participate in a process of 
“reincorporating their alternative and oppositional ideas”.11   
  I will also incorporate research already conducted utilizing blogs with particular 
focus on cyberactivism.  In an increasingly globalizing world, even Cuba cannot 
completely isolate itself from outside influences.  The cyberactivism networks now easily 
accessible via the Internet have resulted in a trans-issue, trans-national support network 
for Cuban bloggers and others.  Sites such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Global 
Voices, Voces Cubanas, and many others provide locations in which activists throughout 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Fernandes, S. (2007). Cuba Represent! Cuban arts, state power and the making of new revolutionary 
cultures. Durham: Duke University Press. 
11 Ibid., p. 23 
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the world can share their own situations, mobilize international support and have a voice 
they may not be free to have locally.12  
Global Voices and Voces Cubanas are what Adrienne Russell (2009) refers to as 
“aggregator sites”13 where blogs with similar themes, as is the case with Global Voices, 
or with a specific demographic makeup, as is the case with Voces Cubanas, can link 
together in a single domain.  Through the website www.globalvoices.com viewers can 
read the posts of bloggers throughout the world, including posts from both Sánchez and 
Cadelo, in varying degrees of political repression and freedom.  The Internet is providing 
bloggers with a powerful tool in the process of dismantling the master discourse model of 
the Cuban State.  Although the Cuban government is working to thwart the effects of 
these bloggers by imposing and island-wide ban Voces Cubanas and all associated sites, 
effective August 28, 2009.  Sánchez’ website has been banned since 2008.  
I have chosen Sánchez and Cadelo as the protagonists of this thesis because both 
women are not only actively involved in the political aspects of the blogging world but 
have been instrumental in the formation of Voces Cubanas and Itinerario Blogger, a 
Cuban blogger support / instructional group (with the goal of encouraging and teaching 
other Cubans to blog) which meets weekly in Havana and monthly in other locations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I came across a perfect example of this while ‘surfing’ YouTube for interviews with Yoani Sánchez 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KeqcZTLWIPE).  She recorded a short video clip asking for assistance 
from the international blogger community, especially those from countries with similar censorship practices 
as Cuba.  She says that her message is one ‘in a bottle thrown to sea’ and that she hopes for ideas of how to 
overcome Cuba’s technological constraints and censorship.  
13 Russell, A. & Echchaibi, N. (2009). International Blogging: Indentity, politics, and networked publics. 
New York: Peter Lang. p. 5. 
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throughout the island. Additionally both have profiles on Facebook, MySpace, and 
Twitter and are very deliberately and actively working to inform the world of the Cuban 
government’s restrictions on both their lives and their freedom to write about their lives.  
They are also very good friends and their blogs often reflect their friendship and shared, 
lived commitments.  As both are prolific bloggers I have chosen to limit my use of their 
blogs for this thesis to the month of June, 2009; Sánchez posted 19 blogs during the 
month and Cadelo posted 16.  I will from time to time mention other bloggers in order to 
convey a more holistic conception of Voces Cubanas but will do so minimally. 
The Internet and Cuba  
In 2006 French journalist Claire Voeux spent a month in Cuba for Reporters 
Without Borders (RSF) finding out just how Cuba deals with the Internet.  Her account is 
included in an article written by Julien Pain14.  Pain writes that only 2% of Cubans have 
access to the Internet, the lowest rate of Internet usage in all of Latin America.  He points 
out the irony of this given the level of pride Cuba takes in the quality of its educational 
system.  In Voeux’s contribution, she writes of the readily available Internet access in 
hotels available to foreigners yet the long lines, so characteristic of Cuba that they have 
their own name – la cola,15 which await Cubans in public Internet cafes. 
Tourists may have to wait for a few minutes in a soft armchair with a strawberry and 
chocolate ice-cream at the Hotel Inglaterra, but the Cubans have to spend half an hour 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Pain, J. & Voeux, C. (2006, October). Going online in Cuba: Internet under surveillance. Retrieved 
August 6, 2009, from http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_gb_md_1.pdf. 
15 Corbett, B. (2002). This is Cuba. Cambridge: Westview Press. p. 15 
11	  	  
	  
or 45 minutes jammed against each other in a line at the nearest Correo de Cuba, just 
30 metres away at the foot of the Capitol building.16 
Voeux describes how, at the Capitol, a security guard lords over the line offering the 
foreigners a fast track to the front of the line.  She points out that unlike in the Hotel 
Inglaterra where she provided her passport number upon check-in, she was only asked for 
her name and country of origin at the public café.17  In order to maintain control over the 
flow of information the Cuban government restricts Internet access to only those Cubans 
they anticipate really need access such as professors, government representatives, some 
doctors, etc while foreign diplomats or employees of foreign companies also have full 
access, the average Cuban is limited to a national email system which allows them to 
email both domestically and internationally but not to surf the Internet.  The government 
has established an alert system that notifies them if certain “subversive” words are used 
in an email.  Voeux describes a tenuous moment during her stay in Cuba in which she 
opened an email from RSF with the names of dissident Cubans.  She had just enough 
time to read the names and numbers before a message flashed on the screen which read: 
“This programme will close down in a few seconds for state security reasons”.18 
Pain addresses Cuba’s system of “self-censorship”, which I will discuss in greater 
detail below, by pointing out that “In Cuba, you can get a 20-year prison sentence for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Voeux, p. 1 
17 When I used the internet in the same café within the Capitol Building in 2008 I was asked for my name 
and my passport number, and there was no ice cream at the Hotel Inglaterra. 
18 Voeux, p. 2 
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writing a few ‘counter-revolutionary’ articles for foreign websites, and a five-year one 
just for connecting with the Internet in an illegal manner.”  With consequences as severe 
as these, “few people dare to defy state censorship”.  While this seems to still be the case 
three years later the number of people defying state censorship and the state approved 
modes of civic participation is increasing.  Though much of the world’s cyber attention 
has been directed towards Iran and China in recent months, the Cuban bloggers are still 
writing and contesting official propaganda on life in Cuba today. Cadelo explains in an 
interview with Radio Martí, that both she and Sánchez have had to rely more and more 
on their friends abroad to post their blogs onto their sites.19 In Radio Martí’s interview of 
Yoani Sánchez on May 1120, she asks for the help of tourists to overcome the 
government’s censorship by buying internet cards for the bloggers as they are no longer 
able to do so themselves.  Given the very limited access to Internet on the island, the 
bloggers write almost exclusively to an international audience, but their activities have 
not gone completely unnoticed nor are they thought to be completely innocuous. 
Just as some authors have argued that the Internet acts as a democratizing tool so too do 
some authors make the case that increased governmental Internet usage increases that 
government’s transparency and makes it more difficult for tyrannical regimes to operate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Radio Martí (2009, May 7). Claudia Cadelo afirma sequirá poniendo sus informaciones en Internet, a 
pesar de la repression en Cuba (Claudia Cadelo affirms that she will continue posting on the Internet 
despite repression in Cuba). Retrieved August 10, 2009 from 
http://www.martinoticias.com/fullstory.aspx?id=A9E3E5DF-26E6-44CA-93EBAA4965179591. 
20 Radio Martí (2009, May 11). Valora Yoani Sánchez las limitaciones que enfrentan en Cuba los blogueros 
(Yoani Sánchez evaluates the limitations bloggers face in Cuba). Retrieved August 10, 2009 from 
http://www.martinoticias.com/fullstory.aspx?id=D6B39C80-ECBB-409A-91624B7A986D4A2D. 
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with a business-as-usual approach.  Shanthi Kalathil (2003)21 urges international leaders 
to work with dictators to increase their dependence on the Internet in order to improve 
efficiency and reduce bureaucracy.  She argues that this would be a more effective means 
of reducing the governments’ control on the flow of information than would be 
supporting cyber-dissidents.  She writes that “once strong-arm regimes open the door to 
technology, they may find it difficult to return to a culture of bureaucratic secrecy, 
unscrupulous abuse, and unaccountability”.22 
 
Cyberactivism 
The rhetoric that surrounds blogging essentially describes the liberating potential 
of a new (American) cultural product, created and distributed globally through 
inherently democratizing digital tools and networks.  More specifically, a rash of 
recent works outlines the emergence of a new more horizontal politics and 
journalism driven by blogs and the networks that blogs seem to engender.23 
Cyberactivism, though with less technologically advanced precedents, is a 
relatively new phenomenon.  The development of the Internet into a tool readily available 
and a daily component of many people’s personal and professional lives has necessitated 
a complete restructuring of social and political interactions.  Though rhetorical resistance, 
or printed dissent, has been around for centuries, the Internet has provided individuals 
who are formally disenfranchised and censored by their governments a space in which 
they can make their voices heard.  While governments adhering to principles of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Kalathil, S. (2003). Dot Com for Dictators. Foreign Policy, March/April. 
22 Ibid., p. 49. 
23 Russel, p. 2. 
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participatory democracy have pre-Internet modes of communication with the plebian 
masses, the Internet has facilitated those interactions and where such interactions are 
limited or non-existent the Internet has provided a public space more embracive than the 
political landscape on the ground.  The Internet has changed the face of social and 
political dynamics affecting the ways in which hegemonic discourse is constructed and 
reconstructed.  It is another public space where minds can meet, debate, grow, reject, etc.  
Social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter are allowing people 
from all over the world to create a cyber community of allies and advocates.  Blogs have 
also been instrumental in the spread of information not just in countries where 
government censorship is the norm but in many facets of social and political life.   
In the United States blogs have become an increasingly more common way for 
the average American to access information and to stay connected with local, national, 
and international events.  Arianna Huffington’s the Huffington Post is an example of a 
very well respected aggregator blog site that has become a news source that competes 
with mainstream news outlets.  As Russell writes in an introduction to the book 
International Blogging: Identity, politics, and networked publics there are many people 
who view the spread of the blogging and social networking world as one means of 
effectively spreading democratic principles and political transparency, a view that is 
echoed by Lauren Langman (2005)24 as explained below.  Blogs have become an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Langman, L. (2005). From virtual public spheres to global justice: A critical theory of Internetworked 
Social Movements. Sociological Theory, 23(1). 
15	  	  
	  
increasingly valuable venue for political discourse and confrontation25 and while the 
quality and reliability of the writing has been called into question26 there is no denying 
that they are presenting challenges to governments attempting to censor their citizens and 
restrict the flow of information.  
In a fascinating article on “internetworked” social movements, Langman invokes 
the familiar argument that “domination fosters resistance”27 and that if people were 
allowed to consent to authority and withdraw and reassign consent when appropriate, 
they would have more power in the polity.  He contends that the growing sector of 
cyberactivism requires “new kinds of theorization”28.  He offers his theory of 
“internetworked” social movements as a response to this scholarly void.  Langman 
writes:  
But what must be noted is that the rise of the Internet, as new communication media, 
has enabled new means of transmitting information and communication that has in 
turn enabled new kinds of communities and identities to develop.29  
 
Langman argues that given the rise of the Internet and the ways in which it now allows 
people to express themselves and their situations and to interact with the rest of the 
world, a new theory needs to be developed to explain the workings of such spaces.  He 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Blumenthal, M.M. (2005). Toward an open-source methodology: What we can learn from the 
blogosphere. Public Opinion Quarterly 69(5). 
26 Doostdar, A. (2004). “The vulgar spirit of blogging”: On language, culture, and power in Persian 
Weblogestan. American Anthropolist, 106(4). 
27 Langman, p. 42 
28 Ibid., p. 43 
29 Ibid., p. 44. 
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seems to settle on new social movements or international social movements theory that 
tends to combine critical theory, political process theory and others with an 
understanding of computer mediated communication.  Although he mentions several 
times that these social movements tend to be in direct opposition to capitalism and the 
ways in which capitalism engenders inequalities, he also describes how the Internet is a 
democratizing tool and a space in which individuals who may otherwise be silenced 
become “empowered agents seeking democratic ‘imagined’ political communities…”.30   
Yet, the new economic or political forms of alienation, domination, or episodic crises 
of legitimacy can now be discussed and critiqued in the ‘virtual public spheres’ where 
people attempt to interpret and understand crises, injustices, and adversities to 
envision alternatives and map strategies.31 
 
 As the current political confrontations in China and Iran have made clear, social 
networking sites can be a powerful tool in battles over the freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press.  This is most poignantly represented by the fact that the 
governments of both countries severely limited cell phone and Internet services32 and by 
the U.S. government’s direct request to Twitter “to delay a scheduled maintenance 
shutdown” on June 16, 2009 because it would interfere with Iranians using the site to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid., p. 54 
31 Ibid., p. 54 
32 Stone, B. & Cohen, N. (June 15, 2009). Social Networks Spread Defiance Online. The New York Times 
Online. Retrieved June 15, 2009 from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/world/middleeast/16media.html?scp=1&sq=cell%20phone%20block
%20iran&st=cse.  
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communicate and organize the protests in Tehran.33  Although there is debate about just 
how important Twitter has been to the Iranians organizing the protests throughout June 
and July of 200934 there is general consensus that this most recent ‘cyberwar’ has served 
the purpose of mobilizing individuals throughout the world in support of the Iranian 
opposition and has given those of us outside of Tehran a very personal glimpse of what is 
occurring in the streets.35  While the April confrontation in Myanmar was the first 
confrontation referred to as a “Twitter Revolution”, the same is being said of the protests 
in Iran.  Similarly the Uighurs plight in Xinjiang, China has become an internationally 
accessible event despite the Chinese government’s attempts to block cell phone and 
Internet services in the region.   
As Cuban bloggers are writing under a more politically repressive regime than 
most other Latin Americans it is helpful to look at research done on blogs in places such 
as China and the Middle East, where repressive social control mechanisms are also 
employed.   In a blog posted on the site Arab Media and Society Mark Lynch (2007) 
proposes that there are three different types of Arab bloggers: the activists, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 New York Times report dated June 16, 2009, retrieved July 9, 2009. 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/report-state-department-urges-twitter-to-delay-
shutdown/?scp=1&sq=twitter%20state%20department&st=cse 
34 Cohen, N. (2009, June 20). Twitter on the Barricades: Six lessons learned. The New York Times Online. 
Retrieved June 20, 2009 from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/weekinreview/21cohenweb.html?scp=3&sq=twitter%20revolution%2
0iran&st=cse.  
35 A notable example is the video of the death by shooting of a young woman, Neda, now accessible 
through YouTube; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZmrB2FOLqiE. In the text included with the video 
current.com writes “This YouTube clip has gone viral, resulting in Neda becoming a symbol of rebellion 
amongst protesters.” 
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bridgebloggers, and the public sphere bloggers.  The activists are those who use the blogs 
as a political tool organizing political action, disseminating information and rallying 
support.  Bridgebloggers (also referred to as bridge-builders)36 are those who write to 
Western audiences, often in English, in an effort to share aspects of their societies or 
cultures.  Public sphere bloggers are those who write about their experiences without any 
political agenda.37 Working within this framework the Cuban bloggers examined herein 
are mainly activist bloggers though I speculate that earlier on in the blog movement some 
of the bloggers would have claimed that they were public sphere bloggers simply writing 
about their lived experiences.  The difference now is that in addition to writing about 
daily experiences the bloggers write about how these experiences are direct 
contradictions to the discourse model that the Cuban government actively attempts to 
propagate; the disparity between verbal and physical realities. 
Although Manuel Castells (2004) focuses on the ways that the Internet and 
Internet based public spheres are being used by marginal groups in opposition to what he 
calls the “new global order”, and arguably the Cuban bloggers are doing just the opposite, 
his discussion is relevant.38  He writes that the Internet has contributed to the “sudden 
acceleration of the historical tempo, and the abstraction of power in a web of computers”. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Russell, p. 5 and MacKinnon, 2007. 
37 Lynch, M. (2007, February).  Blogging the new Arab public.  Arab Media & Society, 1, 1-30. Retrieved 
June 27, 2009 from http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=10. 
 
38 It seems to me that Sánchez and Cadelo’s dissent takes the shape of yearning to have a place in that “new 
global order” and view the Cuban state as keeping them from being free to do so. 
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Castells conceives of this “abstraction of power” as part of a broader collapse of social 
orders brought on by the combination of globalization and “informationalization”.  While 
he concedes that this era of “informationalization” is leading to increased “cultural 
creativity and communication potential”; he sees this new space as disenfranchising and 
leading to an increased “sense of disorder”.39  Fernandes’ interpretation of the effects of 
the inclusion of dissident or divergent populations into the discursive framework is that it 
contributes less to disorder than to a continuous reconfiguration of hegemony.  She 
suggests that: 
…we conceive of hegemony as a process of partial reincorporation, or the efforts of 
actors at various levels to assimilate counter-dominant expressions and practices into 
official discourses and institutions.  Hegemony is always being made and remade, but 
in a moment of crisis when the system faces challenges from a variety of groups, we 
can see the process of reincorporation much more clearly.40   
This processorial view of hegemony may be accurately conceived of as fragmenting the 
current, dominant discourse models globally, it can also be applied more specifically to 
the Cuban situation.  Sánchez and Cadelo are offering counterhegemonic interpretations 
of Cuban reality and seeking the freedom to be part of the “new global order” should they 
choose to do so, and to have a voice in the creation and recreation of Cuban discourse 
models.  Fundamentally they are hoping to affect lasting change in their government’s 
policies on the Internet, travel, and freedom of speech, among other things. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Castells, M. (2004). The Power of Identity (2nd Ed.). Malden, Ma: Blackwell Publishing. p. 72. 
40 Fernandes, p. 26. 
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PART 2 
 
DISCOURSE MODELS OF THE CUBAN STATE 
 
Of all forms of symbolism, language is the most highly developed, most subtle, 
and most complicated. 
-S.I. Hayakawa 
The Language of Propaganda 
 In The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power Kubik, analyzes Edward 
Gierek’s (party first secretary in Poland from 1971-1980) use of the language of 
propaganda.   There are some interesting overlaps between the ways in which Gierek and 
Castro utilize language in supporting not only their ideological quests but their own 
personal authority and their persona as the symbol of power and as such applying this 
analysis to Castro and Cuba is appropriate. 
 Kubik embarks upon a lengthy and somewhat complex discussion of the 
semiotics of the language of propaganda.  He draws out several important components 
such as the use of dualisms, manipulation, persuasion, and ritual.  In the language of 
propaganda a dualistic orientation is very important in establishing limits on the way in 
which the recipients of the messages are able to understand their own reality.  The 
language of propaganda is primarily a language of manipulation and control and while 
one could argue that most of us employ such language more often than we would like to 
admit there are certainly alternatives.  Among the alternatives are semiotics which 
express a reality seen through a particular lens and therefore as something relative rather 
than absolute as the language of propaganda insinuates.  Through education and state 
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sponsored propaganda Castro has spread a master discourse model in the hopes of 
establishing the sort of spiritual transformation Guevara envisioned (as will be discussed 
below). 
An important component of the language of propaganda and of Castro’s discourse 
model is that of a stark dualism.  While Castro portrays the United States as the 
incarnation of all that is abhorrent in the world, Castro portrays Cuba as the victim of its 
northern, more powerful aggressor.  In December, 2008 one could find a in Havana a 
billboard that read “Ese absurdo primer mundo (That absurd first world)”; the image 
beneath depicted a car with its hood open and someone offering the car a spoonful of 
corn, implying that ethanol is an “absurd” use of corn as a resource.  To think that the 
first world is anything but absurd in its consumption practices would undermine the very 
foundation of Castro’s regime and his communist-based vision of Patria and Revolution.  
Similarly, the distinction between being a national and being a nationalist is important 
when trying to perpetuate a strict social order, as Castro is doing.  It becomes much easier 
to distinguish between those who are “for Cuba” and those who are “against Cuba”.41   
 Following Castro’s very narrow definition of who qualifies as being “for the state” 
it becomes clear that it is not Cuba as a nation that Cubans are to support but Cuba as a 
nationalistic creation; to oppose Cuban nationalism is to oppose Cuba.  Kubik refers to 
language as magical in its effectiveness at “creating an artificial reality” and as capable of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See discussion of Miller’s On Nationality on page 24. 
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“establish[ing] social boundaries of the elite”.42  In a fascinating discussion on the 
“degree of homology”43 between the “verbal world” and the “existential world”44 Kubik 
ties in both Alfred Korzybski’s discussion of language as a map and S. I. Hayakawa’s 
extension of the same idea.  All three argue that when there is a high ‘degree of 
homology’ between the map of the verbal world and that of the existential world than an 
individual’s chance of being a successful member of society is greater.  When, on the 
other hand there is a low degree of homology an individual “will not be adjusted to the 
world as it is; he may, if the lack of adjustment is serious, end up in a mental hospital”.45  
Hayakawa writes that one of the dangers of this disconnect is that we as individuals can 
“manufacture at will, with language, ‘maps’ which have no reference to the extensional 
world”.46  More readily applicable to the matter at hand is that those in positions of 
totalitarian power can also “manufacture at will” a map of the verbal world with little to 
no homology between it and the map of the existential world.  This may be one of the 
tactics employed in an effort to manipulate and persuade people to accept a mythical 
version of reality.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Ibid., p. 48 
43 Ibid., p. 48-49 
44 Hayakawa, S.I. (1964). Language in thought and action (2nd ed.). New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
Inc. p. 31. 
45 Ibid., p. 31. 
46 Ibid., p. 32. 
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 Kubik distinguishes between the acts of manipulation and persuasion by explaining 
that as a form of persuasion the language of propaganda is an ineffective marketing 
mechanism except among a very small percentage of the population.  “Whereas 
persuasion is a technique for constructing authority, manipulation is a direct exercise of 
power, since, by definition, the person being manipulated is not aware of this fact.”  
These two tactics form what Kubik refers to as the basic modes of the language of 
propaganda.  Together they serve the important role of clogging “society’s channels of 
communication” so that all people are exposed to the sounds and images of the 
propaganda.  “The higher the saturation of a society’s channels of communication with 
the language of propaganda, the greater the probability of the emergence of apathy as a 
predominant social mode”47, Kubik proposes. 
La Patria, Cuban nationalism and the State 
Much like Gierek’s dualistic distinction between the capitalist West and the 
communist East, Fidel relies heavily in his speeches and reflections48 on sustaining the 
idea of the United States as the colosal imperio while perpetuating the notion that Cuba is 
the victim of its vindictive and much more powerful neighbor to the north.  He negates 
the importance of the human rights violations that do exist in Cuba and the economic 
crisis by pointing out the moral inferiority of the United States and George W. Bush, 
whom he refers to as Bushecito, a diminutive suffix often used when referring to children 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Kubik, pp. 47-48 
48 Given the alleged frailty of his health, Castro now rarely makes physical appearances but his ‘reflections’ 
appear regularly in the paper Granma and on the website www.cubadebate.cu.  
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or to people for whom you feel some sense of responsibility or superiority, or affection.  
In this case it is clearly a belittling use of a diminution.   
For most of la revolución Cuba was financially dependent on the Soviet Union 
and benefitted from a close relationship with the world’s second super power.  With the 
fall of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the “special period” in 1991, Cuba found 
itself ideologically isolated. Fernandes points to this isolation as the motivation behind 
the Cuban state’s transition from a discursive focus on socialism to a more nationalistic 
discourse.  In the name of la Patria all things, all acts are justified.  On the internal wall 
of a semi-abandoned building in Havana Vieja, Cuba someone has meticulously painted a 
poem, attributed to ‘Fidel’49 entitled “And so we say, Patria or Death”50.  The second 
line of the poem states that without Patria “no queremos la vida” (we do not want life).  
Fernandes writes that prior to the special period the phrase had been “socialismo o 
muerte”.51  Despite this dramatic shift in the dominant discourse, the dualistic nature of 
the state’s discourse model has remained consistent over time.  In a speech made in 1953, 
at the beginning of the revolution against the Batista dictatorship, Castro issued this now 
famous proclamation; “…the island will first sink to the sea before we consent to being 
the slaves of anyone”.52 While I will deal primarily with Fidel in particular in this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 I can find no trace of this poem on the internet. 
50 Please see the appendix for a transcribed and translated version of the poem in its entirety. 
51 Fernandes, p. 35.  
52 Tobar, H. (2008, February 23). Castro’s legacy: A changed Latin America. The Los Angeles Times on the 
web. Retrieved April 5, 2009, from http://articles.latimes.com/p/2008/feb/23/world/fg-latin23.  
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discussion it is important to understand that Fidel has personally framed the dominant 
discourse model, the State is still carrying it out and utilizes Fidel’s language in the 
process. 
In arguing a case for both this perpetual state of victimization and the consequent 
perpetual need for la revolución he explains to an audience that the damage done to the 
Cuban people throughout la revolución has been done “for no other reason than that we 
were Cubans, for no other reason than that we wanted independence, for no other reason 
than that we wanted better luck for our people”.53  If the problem is no more complicated 
than that “we were Cubans” and “wanted our independence” it follows that as long as 
Cubans want those things for themselves there will be some external power, most likely 
el imperio, the United States, waiting to thwart them at every turn.  In this way Fidel 
attempts to place the responsibility of failure squarely onto the shoulders el imperio and 
defers concerns of the possibility of failure onto the processorial nature of la revolución. 
The Cuban State with Fidel at its helm has spent the last 50 years fighting an 
ideological battle to bring about the ideal society in Cuba.  Their weapons for fighting 
this battle have been both policies aimed at curbing opposition and silencing dissent and a 
deliberately contrived grammar, a language of propaganda.  In short, the State has done 
its best to create a society in which its people believe themselves to be revolutionaries by 
naming and vilifying a near and constant enemy.  Fidel draws a world with his words in 
which the inconveniences of revolutionary existence are nothing compared to both the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Castro (2005), p. 30 
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alternative: a semi-colonial, capitalistic country; and to the goal, which is the ‘most just 
society’.  He attempts, at times very successfully, to alter the landscape of the existential 
world by manipulating the maps of the verbal world.  It seems that his goal has been to 
first create the myth of an ideal Cuban society, and to then diligently and deliberately 
infuse that myth into the consciousness of Cubans with the hope that they too will see 
their sacrifices as a national effort toward a national goal. Guevara was an integral figure 
in establishing what exactly it meant to be Cuban under the Castro regime.  He wrote a 
short essay entitled “Socialism and Man in Cuba” in which he outlines what is now 
referred to as ‘Ché’s new socialist man’.  Guevara writes:  
It is clear that work still has coercive aspects, even when it is voluntary; man as yet 
has not transformed all the coercion surrounding him into conditioned reflexes of a 
social nature, and in many cases he still produces under the pressure of the 
environment (Fidel calls this moral compulsion).  He still has to achieve complete 
spiritual re-creation in the presence of his own work, without the direct pressure of 
the social environment but bound to it by new habits.  That will be communism.54   
What Guevara is calling for in this essay is not the sort of superficial state driven 
compliance that is currently at work in Cuba but a true internal, spiritual, transformation.  
He argues that Cubans should be motivated not by material incentives but by moral 
incentives; such as knowing that personal sacrifice results in the betterment of fellow 
Cubans life and contributes to the humanistic machinery of the project of Cuban-styled 
socialism. While he was alive and serving in the Cuban government his economic 
reforms were based on moral incentives.  This turned out to be a relatively ineffectual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See appendix A for the final several lines of this essay. 
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method and after his departure and subsequent death the government shifted to a material 
incentive based economy, not capitalism however (I find the distinction interesting).  
In On Nationality David Miller (1999) discusses the fictitious nature of nations 
elaborating on the same notion Benedict Anderson introduces in Imagined Communities.  
Much of his argument revolves around the creation of a national identity.  One of the 
components of this creation is that of national myth making.  He begins his chapter 
entitled ‘National Identity’ by stating that the existence of a nation depends upon 
people’s belief in that nation and is not something that exists empirically.  He describes 
errors that people make when thinking of the members of a nation; that the “national 
identity must be monolithic and all-embracing”, “that ‘national character’ consists… of a 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions”.55  He goes on to describe how this unification 
under one “national identity” becomes more important when it is being threatened.  
“With the activist element added nationality does this for us: ‘the nation’ conveys the 
idea of a circumscribed body of people bound together by common customs and capable 
of being represented by a prince or a parliament”.56  This notion becomes very important 
when investigating Castro’s Cuba.  Though Castro is no prince and what he hopes binds 
his people together are not common customs but a shared belief in the Revolution, the 
activist element has been instrumental in Castro’s perpetuation of the ideals of the 
Revolution for 50 years running. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Miller, D. (1995). On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 26-27 
56 Ibid., p. 30. 
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Miller draws an important distinction between being a national and being a 
nationalist.  One could consider oneself Cuban in the national sense but oppose the State 
and communism and therefore not be a nationalist.  In distinguishing between nation and 
nationalism Miller writes that “nationalism theories” give people not only something to 
defend, as will be discussed, but provide “distortions of reality which allow men to cope 
with situations they might otherwise find unbearable”.57  I would add that such distortions 
are often engendered by a persuasive leader and manipulated to further the nationalistic 
cause.  He draws this conversation together with a discussion on conservative nationalism 
and collective autonomy (discussed in more detail below) and points out that “it is… a 
legitimate task of the state to ensure that national myths are preserved and, to the extent 
to which this conflicts with liberal commitments such as those to freedom of thought and 
expression, liberalism must be transcended”.58  In order to arrive at the just society that 
Castro envisions, Cuban people must make sacrifices. 
The Cuban government is seeking to create what Miller describes as “collective 
autonomy”.  Individuals sacrifice what might be considered self-determination in favor of 
“collective autonomy” or “national self-determination” in backing something “that is 
widely shared but far from universal”.  In the name of the pursuit of collective autonomy 
both leaders and participants might find it justifiable to curtail personal liberties.  As we 
have seen with Cuba and the atrocious state of its economy, the entire notion of 	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58 Ibid., p. 125. 
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‘collective autonomy’ in a world that functions with a global economy and global 
transfers of information and goods is a project that is at best incredibly difficult.  As 
Miller writes: “here, then, claims for national self-determination would be claims for a 
kind of autonomy that cannot, in fact, be achieved”.59  Miller goes on to argue that in 
order for national autonomy to coincide with the state, the state itself should be very 
much influenced by “popular will” and should therefore be democratic.  
Fidel is a charismatic and persuasive speaker.  He is eloquent and prolific.  
Though he is no longer the president of Cuba he is a self-constructed symbol of the 
Cuban Revolution and quite arguably the most important symbol.  Throughout 50 years 
of revolution Fidel has developed an effective and deliberate ‘language of propaganda’.  
Through his speeches (now very rare) and his reflections60 he explains away the sorts of 
contradictions present in the Cuban reality expressed by the likes of Sánchez and Cadelo.  
Through an artful combination of dualistic discourse, persuasion and manipulation, 
ritualistic use of limited words and phrases and an interesting effort to attribute agency to 
la revolución he creates a story in which Cuba, and consequently Cubans, are peacefully 
and willingly walking towards an ideal society. 
Participation and Apathy  
 Civic participation is something that is fundamentally integrated into 
Cuban socialism.  With roots going back to the revolution in the latter 1950s and Guevara 	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60 Still regularly published in the state paper Granma and online at www.cubadebate.cu. 
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pushing for an armed population, civic participation has since become highly centralized.  
Early revolutionary efforts at universal civic inclusion in social society included the mass 
teaching campaign to campesinos in the Sierra Maestras and later throughout the entire 
nation. According to Maida Donante-Armada civic participation under the Castro-led 
Cuban state began in 1959 with the mandatory participation of all university students in 
the Brigadas Estudiantiles Universatorias “Jose Antonio Echevarría”, University 
Student Brigades, and all youth 14 years and older, and therefore able to bare arms, in los 
Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarios, National Revolutionary Militias.  The new 
government showed particular interest in university students because of the sector’s 
“historical, policital prestine” and the students’ “higher apacity for reflection”.61  By 
1986, she asserts, the Ministerio del Interior (MININT) had acheived “an apparus of 
societal control that was nearly absolute”.  One necessary component of this apparatus 
was the CDR, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.  
The Cuban government over the years has created numerous outlets for both 
mandatory and voluntary participation.  Cuban scholar Haroldo Dilla Alfonso62 has 
dedicated a major part of his career to discussions of participation and social organization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Donante-Armada, M. (1996). Sociedad civil, control social y estructura del poder en Cuba (Civil society, 
social control and power structure in Cuba). Retrieved November 10, 2009 from 
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba6/37Donate.fm.pdf. p. 284. 
62 Haroldo Dilla Aflonso is a well-known Cuban intellectual once associated with Cuba’s Centro de 
Estudios sobre America, which was disbanded for political reasons in 1996.  While once a professor at the 
University of Havana, Dilla has since left Cuba but remains a prolific writer on themes such as civic 
participation, social organization, and Cuban socialism. 
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in Cuba.  In an article written in 1999 with Philip Oxhorn,63 Dilla describes the numerous 
types of umbrella social organizations in Cuba.  The authors explain that there are 2,154 
“legal civil associations” in Cuba.  These include cultural groups, theater groups, 
Masonic lodges, associations of pigeon fanciers, etc… 
The Organizaciones Sociales y de Masas, “Social Organizations and of the 
Masses” (OSMs); while diverse in focus, share in common their “relationship with the 
State as “belts of transmission” in the classic, vertical, centralized schema”.64  The 
Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) and the Federation of Cuban 
Women (FMC) fall within this category of social organization, as do workers unions.  
Dilla and Oxhorn stress the importance of recognizing the amount of autonomy that 
members of these organizations enjoy.  They write that individual OSMs have the ability 
to adopt their own positions on matters that specifically affect their “spheres of action”.  
Members may also enjoy the benefits of seats in government or in the Party affording 
their organization greater autonomy.  In 1999 when Dilla and Oxhorn published the 
referenced article, the economic crisis had also resulted in greater autonomy for OSMs 
and for the aforementioned official associations.   
 Another sector of social organization is called “Social Community Movements”. 
“The origin of these movements is diverse, but almost all of them have at their roots 
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64 Ibid., p. 135. 
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some state imposed initiative...”65  While their roots can be found with the state Dilla and 
Oxhorn write that these organizations often find themselves in “contradictions with local 
authorities” and enjoy the autonomy to make their own decisions because they are not 
“judicially” associated organizations.  These organizations however are distinct from 
dissident organizations as many of the organizations that fall into the Social Community 
Movements category function with the approval and cooperation of local authorities. 
There are no dissident groups that operate with legal consent of the state but many are 
tolerated as long as their activities are conducted in private.  These groups tend to be 
small and tend to share three dominant characteristics.  First, because of their size they 
have no “influence over national life”.  Second, their membership is often composed of 
individuals who hope or plan to immigrate to the United States and so a high turn over 
rate has contributed to their ineffectiveness.  Lastly, because of many of the groups’ 
focuses align with the beliefs of the Cuban ex-pat community in the United States, the 
government “marks them with an antinational stamp”.66   
 While I could certainly embark on an in-depth discussion of each of the categories 
of social organization, for the purposes of this paper I will focus very specifically on the 
CDRs with brief treatment of other OSMs.  I will, naturally, also discuss dissident groups 
and, briefly, recent mass responses to public displays of dissent. 
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The CDRs were first organized in 1960 and were designed to act as a system of 
checks and balances for society at large.  They were to report any counter-revolutionary 
activity as well keep the bureaucracy in check.  There is a CDR in every neighborhood, 
or barrio, on the island and over the years participation has waxed and waned, apparently 
based in part on the country’s economic solvency at a given moment.  For example in the 
1980s, a particularly successful economic decade, participation in the CDRs was at 80%.  
After the fall of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the “Special Period” in 1989, 
participation decreased.  The CDRs are a component of what Fidel has called Poder 
Popular (Popular Power) and is a form of “participatory democracy” as opposed to 
“electoral democracy” which does not exist in Cuba.  
Donante-Armada writes that CDRs took the place of any pre-existing 
meighborhood associations and “as an organization of the masses, completed the 
permanent presence of the system of control that the regime exercises over the bosom of 
the family”.  Similarly Armando Fernández Soriano, Haroldo Dilla Alfonso, and 
Margarita Castro Flores write that barrios have become “political entities”, a 
characteristic which was increasingly formalized until 1998.  It is important to remember 
however that while the barrios enjoyed a certain level of political independence and 
localized electoral democracy, they were part of a “scheme of paternalistic participation 
and subordinate to a vertical political order with little decentralization.”67  Soriano et. al 
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do mention, in fact it is the focus of this article, that there are nacient barrio associations 
that are functioning outside the framework of the state.  They are, however, few and far 
between.  
CDRs have three main functions; 1. defense of the la revolución, 2. vigilance, and 
3. “control over civilians in residential areas”.68  Donante-Armada writes that in order to 
gain membership into other organizations, such as the FMC, one must first be a member 
of a CDR.  The incipient CDRs were used as points of food distribution and still handle 
the distribution of the libretas (ration books).  CDRs have been instrumental in executing 
widespread health programs such as vaccinations and mass diagnoses.  It falls on the 
shoulder of the CDR to ensure that emigrants do not sell or take their possessions, as 
material possessions are considered the property of the state.  In the 60s and 70s Cuba 
lost many of its wealthier citizens to emigration.  This manner of regulation began both as 
an attempt at punishing emigrants and at achieving a more balanced distribution of 
material wealth, it was “an artful method of nourishing ‘the reclamation of a more just 
social distribution’”.69   
In each CDR there is a president and a vice president which are each elected by 
the members of that particular CDR.  There is also a position called “el responsable de 
vigilancia” or “he who is responsible for vigilance”.  This position is a combination of 
appointment, MININT approval, and election.  The zone assembly, group of neighboring 	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CDRs, select a person who then must be found trustworthy by a MININT official.  
Donante-Armada writes that while there is an election involved in the selection of this 
individual, CDR members are often afraid to vote against the MININT official’s choice 
for fear of being thought to be counter-revolutionary. 
In addition to el responsable de vigilancia there is a group of individuals in each 
barrio that serve as informants directly to MININT on barrio goings-on.  These 
informants have no official membership to any organization but occassionally refer to 
themselves as “Brigadas de Activistas Voluntarios”, “Activist Volunteers Brigade”.  
These individuals tend to be anonymous to the rest of the community and serve not only 
as an extra pair of eyes, but also serve the purpose of provoking residents in an effort to 
uncover counter-revolutionaries.  The volunteer brigades are related, and potentially a 
stepping stone, to the more notorious “Brigadas de Respuesta Rápida”70, “Rapid 
Response Brigades”.  The government claims that these brigades are “paramilitary” and a 
result of the “sponaneity of the masses” but Donante-Armada suspects a more direct 
connection to the state than such a statement would indicate.71  Members of these 
brigades often operate in communities in which they are not familiar.  So while the CDRs 
do contribute to the sustenance of a strong communitarian structure, the brigades infringe 
on that sense community by imposing strangers whose intentions are known to be 
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extreme.  Even pro-revolution community members feel a sense of betrayal when 
“collectivities of strangers… act against members of the neighborhood or the workplace” 
undermining the solidarity the CDRs had so well established throughout the 70s and 
80s.72 
In a video posted on www.cubainformacion.tv.73 a Cuban broadcaster explains 
that the CDRs are a continuation of the internal political structure designed to protect 
Cubans from the aggression of el imperio, the United States.  She quotes Fidel as having 
said: “we are going to establish a system of collective revolutionary vigilance”.  During 
the course of her explanation of the CDRs the video shows Fidel giving a speech to an 
enormous crowd in what appears to be temporally very close to the revolution.  There are 
also snapshots of planes dropping bombs and of revolutionaries marching through the 
streets of Havana.  Once the broadcaster has sufficiently demonstrated the threat from el 
imperio and the necessity of collective vigilance, there appear photos of happy Cubans 
working in green houses, fixing pipes, cleaning streets, and generally working together.   
The official social structure, as here represented by the CDRs, is just one example 
of how the government addressed participation. Another very prominent example can be 
found within the education system; both in the goals of a maintaining a well-educated 
population and the way in which that education is carried out across the island.   
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In the wake of the Elian Gonzalez dispute, the Cuban government initiated the 
“Battle of Ideas”; in fact this was the official response to the conflict .74  The government 
capitalized on the popular feelings aroused by the Elian conflict and “rediscovered that 
youth could be used in the ideological struggle”.75  The “Battle of Ideas” became an 
effort to get back to the Guevaristic effort of utilizing moral incentives to motivate 
students.  According to a Ministry of Education official the objective was to provide “full 
access to the culture of education” in order to compensate for the lack of material and 
cultural capital.76  Or perhaps “Castro was trying to ride two horses at the same time, 
retaining the ideological fervor for the revolution and at the same time allowing a 
capitalist sector to grow”.77  Lutjens frames the Battle of Ideas in terms of preparation for 
“Cuban-style democracy” and adherence to the constitutional imperative that education is 
a societal responsibility.  While education was just one component of the Battle of Ideas, 
it infused educational policy with a refocusing on the value of labor and cooperation in 
the creation of the ideal Cuban socialist participant.  Again students, en masse, were sent 
to the countryside to participate in the work of the campesinos. 78   These countryside 
boarding schools increased a sense of solidarity among pupils in isolation from outside 
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influence, including familial, and immerse students in socialist ideology.79  Whether the 
omission is intentional or otherwise, Lutjens never mentions the economic benefits to the 
government that this combination of work and learning provided.   
Christopher Worthman and Lourdes Kaplan discovered that while the Cuban 
government cited its curricular focus on dialogic exchange, the reality in the classroom 
was at best a very superficial attempt at true classroom dialogue.  While on an 
unsanctioned visit to a Havana school they observed a teacher asking questions about a 
piece of literature the students had yet to read based on an included illustration.  The 
answers were embedded within the questions and it seemed obvious to Worthman and 
Kaplan that there were standard answers for ideologically driven questions, for example 
in response to the question “How do you know that this story took place in the country?” 
students began discussing the “rural origins” of the revolution.  What struck Worthman 
and Kaplan most was “the disjunction between educational success and economic and 
social life”.  The literacy pedagogy utilized in Cuban schools gives them the tools to be 
critical of the Batista regime and the United States but does not give them the tools to 
“deal with another regime”.  Breidlid echoes this concern writing that the education 
system is designed to promote one discourse to the exclusion of all others.  There is “only 
one truth, only one version of history”.80  Worthman and Kaplan go on to recommend 
that literacy be redefined; that 	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…literacy… must be used to work the tensions between reality (naming the world) 
and possibility (redefining the world) and between what we are and what we hope to 
become as individuals and communities.81 
Breidlid again concurs with a discussion on the ways the Cuban government utilizes a 
discourse of inclusion (gender, race) and exclusion (ideological differences).  He writes 
that “one of the most problematic aspects of the Cuban system, is, however, the forceful 
imposition of the hegemonic discourse, leaving almost no space for alternative 
discourse”.82  While the government claims to create an environment of dialogic 
exchange which would prepare Cuban students for an active role in participatory 
democracy, these authors argue that such an effort is, at this point, paying lip service to 
an ideal that is intentionally undermined. 
José Martí is viewed as the national hero of Cuba: to the Cuban state he is the 
embodiment of the revolutionary spirit giving his to life to the fight against imperialism; 
to those who oppose the state he is the embodiment of true freedom and liberty which 
they see the state as having limited severely.  Both sides of this particular coin look to the 
writings of José Martí for guidance, inspiration, and poetic justification for their actions 
and arguments.  For example, on the Internet homepage of Granma, the state run 
newspaper, Martí’s quote “to be educated is the only way to be free” runs across of the 
top of the page next to a picture of Guevara.  Similarly on the website Vitral, the Cuban 
Catholic Church’s online journal, Dagoberto Valdéz Hernandez quotes Martí as having 	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written that “… like wings to a bird, like wind to the wings, so is liberty the essence of 
life”.83  Valdez discusses in depth the ways in which the Castro regime began the 
revolution with what might be proper notions of liberty and civic participation.  The 
Castros and Guevara and the other members of the party vanguard sought to equalize the 
social and economic conditions of Cubans with the goal of establishing a more just and 
liberated society.  “The communion of justice and liberty clearly marked the popular 
character of that change”.84  He contends that though there is honor in such an endeavor 
the modes of accomplishing this were counter to the desired outcome.  How does one 
increase the liberty of the citizens of the nation by taking social, political, and economic 
control out of the hands of the masses and instead adopting a paternalistic order involving 
centralized control of all forms of public (and Valdez argues, private) life and 
organization of labor and participation?  According to Valdez such an effort inevitably 
results in the gradual loss of personal freedoms. 
Benigno Aguirre, in a discussion on forms of social control in Cuba adds his 
name to a long list of critics of the Cuban government’s behavior towards the citizens it 
claims to protect under a socialist manifesto.  According to Aguirre social control in 
Cuba is enacted by a careful balance of freedom and restraint and by a blurring of the 
lines between external (or state driven) control and internal (or population driven) 
control.  He writes that “Cuba is an excellent case study of a national political system that 	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combines formal and informal systems of social control into a hegemonic ideology, a 
national political culture, and a centrally planned society”.85  He argues that even the 
shadow institutions such as the black market, which I will discuss in more depth below, 
are controlled by the state both directly and indirectly. The presence of prostitution on an 
island whose government vehemently opposes the practice in rhetoric and operates such 
tight controls over other aspects of life, is another example of a shadow institution. 
Though people involved in these processes are participating in elicit behavior, their 
behavior is sanctioned by the government which may acknowledge the necessity of these 
‘subversive’ organizations. The existence of these institutions is the result of “the 
inherent waste and mismanagement of a centrally managed economy”.  They are part of a 
broader trend of Cuban individuals “enact[ing] alternative subcultures” outside the 
boundaries of state sanctioned modes or participation.86  Another interpretation of this 
trend is that while the Cuban state has, since the late 90s, become more intolerant (again) 
of “formal political activities” outside the framework of the state, and critical of it, it has 
become increasingly tolerant of “criticism within the arts where counterhegemonic 
expressions could be monitored by the state and reincorporated into dominant 
frameworks”.87 
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86 Aguirre, p. 85 
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Regardless of the importance to the state’s economy, people who do participate in 
the black market and shadow institutions are susceptible to the occasional government 
crackdown in which an individual with illicit employment may lose everything to state 
officials.  Here we have a clear example of the state providing its citizenry with the 
freedom to participate in illicit activities yet with the fear of the restraining power of the 
government looming large and at the ready.   
Aguirre writes of yet another contradiction in Cuba’s manner of dealing with 
social control; that Cuba is an interesting combination of rigid and open.  Cuba is open to 
participation in “officially approved activities and programs” yet rigid in “its insistence 
on preserving the principles the government identifies as key elements for maintaining 
political hegemony”.88   
Valdez analyzes the extent to which Cubans have gone in relinquishing their 
grasp on liberty writing that through the “paternalism of the State and the hegemonical 
role of a single ideology” Cubans have become docile and lost the autonomy necessary 
for any possession of political power.89  Through an examination of writers such as 
Fromm, Martí, and Varela he concludes that Cubans have fallen into the oft occurring 
lethargy attached to autocratic rule with its incipient loss of self-esteem and self-
actualization.  Guevara warns against complacency within the revolution; against “a 
comfortable drowsiness which is taken advantage of by our irreconcilable enemy, by 	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89 Valdez, p. 4. 
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imperialism, which gains ground”.90  While Valdez and Guevara view the lethargy as 
resultant of different factors it is apparent that the elder found complacency a threat while 
the contemporary finds it a reality.  Steeped in the debilitating bureaucracy of the Cuban 
state, the incentives for efficient work are almost non-existent.  In Cuba, everyone is paid 
by the state regardless of how hard they work and often when they attempt to work hard 
within the structure of the state they are thwarted by others lack of efficiency or the lack 
of the efficiency of the state as a productive machine.91  Rafael Hernández and Dilla 
(write “participation in productive tasks… reflects a new concept of labor and social 
property”.  While this has been the result of consistent mass propaganda, there has been a 
lack of focus on attitudes towards work, and this has led to a “lack of discipline and low 
productivity”.92  
The existence of a civil society93 within Cuba indicates the government’s 
diminishing control over the actions of its constituents94 and at the same time the result of 
a perceived “break in the contract between state and nation.”95 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Guevara, p. 168. 
91 Corbett, p. 14 
92 Hernández, R. & Dilla, H. (1991). Political culture and popular participation in Cuba. Latin American 
Perspectives, 18(2), p. 41. 
93 Dilla and Oxhorn define civil society as “the social fabric formed by a multiplicity of self-constituted 
entities (territorial or functional), heterogeneous in their compositions and goals, that coexist in situations 
of conflict, negotiations and agreements, and collectively resist the subordination of the State, at the same 
time that they demand inclusion into the existent political structures.” P. 130. 
94 Aguirre, p. 88; Dilla and Oxhorn, p. 131 
95 Aguirre, p. 88. 
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PART 3 
 
CUBA IN THE POST-SOCIALIST PERIOD 
 
Rhetorical socialism vs. market economics 
At the time of the Revolution, Cuba was divided between a landowning elite and 
peasant working class.  The rebels’ first task once in power was to dismantle the 
entrenched class system.  The 1980s were years of financial stability and ideological 
success.  With the support of the Soviet Union Cubans enjoyed consistency and 
comparatively abundant supplies of food and other resources.  In the wake of the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the subsequent economic collapse in Cuba resulting the “Special 
Period in a Time of Peace”, there has been a dual economy on the island.  While Cubans 
who work for the state (this accounts for most of the white market employment as the 
Cuban economy is narrowly centralized) are paid in pesos nacionales, the tourism sector 
operates under the currency called pesos convertibles or CUCs (which are tied to the 
value of the dollar - .80$ per 1 CUC, 25 nacionales per 1 CUC.  While the CUC has been 
known as the tourist currency and was, until recently, forbidden for Cubans, it has now 
become the dominant currency.  Most things that are for sale are for sale in CUCs with 
the exception of food and some services.  Yet the Cuban who works for the state has no 
access to the CUC.  In order to access that currency one must a) work in the black market 
and deal in that currency, 2) work in the tourist industry, or 3) have a relative who does 
either 1 or 2 or sends money from abroad. It does not take much intellectual yoga to come 
to the conclusion that the regime has begun to create a class system drawn along different 
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lines than those in place during Batista’s regime.  Those who have access to the dollar-
tied CUC are better off than those who do not.  
Fernandes writes about the government’s rhetorical commitment to socialism in 
opposition to the post-Soviet era focus on an increasingly market based economy.  This 
has led to the dual economy that is now the source of so much contention among Cuban 
bloggers.  The State justifies the resultant dualism by maintaining that the development of 
a market based economy was and continues to be necessary for the eventual success of la 
revolución. “There are obvious contradictions between the principles of equality, justice, 
and collectivism professed by the Cuban state and the realities of economic adjustment, 
which have brought about marked inequalities and unemployment.” Fernandes, p. 36.  
The increase in social ills as a result of the market-based economy, such as prostitution 
and “class segmentation” are “distortions” related to the incompleteness of the Cuban 
model of socialism.  To the State these challenges are further illustrations of the 
processorial nature of la revolución.  To many Cubans, including Sánchez and Cadelo, 
the economic system in place in Cuba today is another example of the disjuncture 
between what the State says and what they practice. 
Cuban Education 
Prior to the revolution, Cuba’s dependency on the United States was deeply 
entrenched.  According to Carnoy (1990) “The U.S. virtually controlled the island’s 
economic and political institutions” including “90% of the telephone and electric light 
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and power services”.96  He goes on to describe Cuba’s relationship to the United States as 
a “conditioned dependency” which he explains to be a relationship in which Cuba 
produced a single crop, sugar cane, for nearly exclusive trade with the United States that, 
in return, offered Cuba preferential treatment.  The trade also involved exporting nickel97 
and importing U.S. tourists and gamblers.  The system resulted in severe economic gaps 
between the urban and rural populations. 
One of the earliest incarnations of efforts to achieve this internal transformation 
was to centralize the education system and spread literacy to the peasantry. During the 
revolution against Batista, Castro and Guevara framed the importance of education as 
“the revolution within the revolution”.  In one of the first widespread educational 
reforms, the Castro regime eliminated all private schools, converting them into public, 
free, equal access schools.  In 1961, two years after the triumph of the revolution and 
shortly after declaring Cuba a socialist country, Castro shut down all schools and 
mobilized teachers and students alike to take to the countryside.  Through the literacy 
campaign the Castro regime sought to eliminate illiteracy on the island within nine 
months, teaching “almost one million illiterates how to read”.98  1961 was the “Year of 
Education” and within those nine months the illiteracy rate dropped from 21% to 3.9%, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Carnoy, M. (1990). Education Reform and Social Transformation in Cuba, 1959-1989. In M. Carnoy & 
J. Samoff (Eds.), Education and Social Transition in the Third World (pp. 153-209). Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. p. 155. 
97 Cadelo’s June 19, 2009 blog addresses the environmental and health consequences of nickel mining in on 
Cuban town as one example of the hypocrisy of the state. 
98 Carnoy, 1990, p. 163. 
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“the lowest in Latin America”.99  According to Breidlid, in 1964 UNESCO declared 
Cuba to be a “territory free of illiteracy”.100  
Another important early reform was bringing urban students in contact both with 
rural students and with physical work.  There were the “schools to the countryside” in 
which urban students would spend 45 days in rural areas in sugar cane production and 
other productive employments; and there were the “schools in the countryside”.  These 
latter schools were boarding schools with vocational tendencies.   
The literacy campaign not only brought the revolution to the most physically 
isolated members of Cuban society but also brought the more urban, more educated 
groups (particularly youth) into contact with the rural poor and illiterate.  The campaign 
was therefore a means to connect elements in Cuban society that had been successfully 
separated by the Batista government.101  
In addition to learning about how to become Ché’s ‘new man’ students worked 
for their keep.  The schools were originally intended to be self-sufficient but the 
government drastically overestimated the students’ production and the program ended up 
costing the government much more than they had intended.  The program eventually fell 
out of favor but there are still remnants today as will be discussed below. 
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100 Breidlid, p. 621. 
101 Carnoy, 1990, p. 177. 
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Political participation in Cuba is an integral component of the structure of Cuban 
socialism.  It is part of Guevara’s call for a new Socialist Man understood as a society of 
individuals who put the collective good ahead of individual good and who actively and 
voluntary participate in the political and social order.  Voluntary participation in Cuba is, 
however, strictly structured and in many cases voluntary only in the sense that there is no 
material compensation.  According to Guevara material motivation is something only an 
individual formed in a capitalist society would find necessary in order to participate.  In 
Cuba, for Ché’s new man, participation was to be rewarded by moral compensation, by 
an understanding that an individual’s participation is part of the machinery of the caring 
socialist state.   
Given a complete overhaul of the economic and political systems, education also 
required a complete overhaul.  The combination of an already highly educated population 
(comparatively speaking) and a mass movement to balance the societal scales made 
Cuban schools ripe soil for instilling socialist values and a clear and persistent idea of 
what the threat the new revolution was up against.  During the first decade of la 
revolución the government sought to gain support through schools by using moralistic 
rather than material incentives.  Imperative in this focus was a “trade-off between the 
goals of developing collective consciousness and increasing production and 
consumption”.102  Given the capitalistic nature of the country prior to the revolution 
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49	  	  
	  
altering the collective consciousness was a necessary, and continues to be a necessary, 
component of schooling and government driven social structures, like the CDRs.   
  This historical ideological component is something inherent and necessary to the 
success of the revolution.  Schools were the primary mechanism of preparing citizens for 
participation in a new socialist state.  Worthman and Kaplan (2001)103 argue that this 
‘socialist indoctrination’ is the major defect of the Cuban education system.  They go on 
to discuss Freire’s perception that formal schooling “usually” reinforces “existing social 
orders” and that Cuba’s education system was no different, implying that the pre-
revolution gaps in access to education and in achievement remain.  Calling into question 
the value of universal literacy when the curriculum is geared towards teaching students to 
be critical in the ways the government wants them to be critical;  they ask “…at what 
price is achievement gained?”  Similarly Breidlid elaborates on the ways in which the 
Cuban government is struggling to maintain its educational superiority in the face of a 
market economy increasingly driven by capitalism, and is not succeeding.  What is 
apparent in Cuban education is a disconnect between what students are taught to believe 
about their country and what they actually observe; another example of the homologic 
chasm between the verbal and physical world and between the master discourse model 
and individuals’ personal models. 
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While Lutjens describes Cuba as a ‘caring state’ and contends that educational 
policies pursued have resulted in a ‘caring classroom’ in which teachers are both 
“caregivers and embodiments of the new socialist person”.  Others, including Cruz-
Taura104 and Hérnandez, see Cuba as using schools to enact the paternal role of the state.  
“Since 1959, Cuban educational policy has demonstrated a commitment to preparing 
citizens, to fairness and egalitarianism, and to norms of responsibility and respect in 
classrooms, schools, communities and society”. 105  This image of Cuba is exactly what 
the revolutionary founders hoped to achieve and is what Castro continues to claim to 
have achieved.  The notion of Cuba as a caring society or in Castro’s own words the 
closest thing to “the most just society of the world”106. 
Breidlid writes that “The economic crisis in Cuba has led to an educational crisis 
as well, both in terms of teacher shortages and a decrease in quality and in 
political/ideological commitment”.107  Though he still argues that Cuban education is a 
system worth emulating he takes time to point out the ways in which the government is 
failing its students, focusing on governmental efforts to confront the teacher shortage 
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106 Castro (2005). 
107 Breidlid, p. 617. 
51	  	  
	  
crisis.  In 1993 Cuba lost 10% of its teachers to the dollar rich tourist industry.108  From 
the fall of the Soviet Union to the present Cuban officials have described the country as 
in the midst of the Special Period.  The economic effects of the loss of revenue from the 
Soviet bloc had severe implications for Cuba’s education.  In 1993, in an effort to 
recuperate needed capital, Castro lifted the ban on the dollar and opened the country up to 
tourism, directing much needed money away from social projects and rations and into the 
tourist sector.  In a telling example, journalist Ben Corbett writes that in 1992 when rice 
was fifty pesos a pound, the Cuban government sank $8 million dollars into a golf course 
in Varadero, a golf course that was (incidentally) off-limits to Cuban citizens.109   
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PART 4 
 
DISCOURSE MODELS IN CUBAN CYBERACTIVISM 
 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the forced deviance caused by the failure of 
official institutions engenders a generalized cynicism in the population and 
detachment from, if not opposition to, the ideology and programs of the ruling 
party.  It creates marginalized subcultures, such as groups of intellectuals, urban 
youth, the self-employed (cuentapropistas), and small businesspeople.110 
     
Voces Cubanas 
In the Cuban cultural milieu it is understood now that silence is more damaging 
than nonconformity.  
Otero Lisandro111 
 The Cuban blogger movement is becoming increasingly more recognized and 
followed but on an international comparative scale, it seems to still be very small and 
marginal.  The bloggers are following in the footsteps of Cubans who have fought for 
free press in the past, notably the “Gang of 4” (year) who faxed a letter to the Cuban 
government saying, among other things, that “the philosophy of the government is not to 
serve the people but to be their dictator”112 and the contributors to the Varela Project 
(2003) which involved a petition signed by over 10,000 Cubans asking the government 
for a constitutional amendment allowing for freedom of the press.  The government 
responded to the Varela Project by arresting 75 ‘dissidents’ including independent 	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Where is Cuba heading today?). Delegación Coyoacán, México. D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, S.A. de 
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112 Report produced by various entities (August 7, 1998). Digital freedom network starts campaign to free 
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journalists and members of the democratic opposition.113  Given the extent of the political 
confrontations in the Middle East and other parts of the world it is not entirely surprising 
that Cuba’s own cyberactivism is minimally recognized in international media outlets as 
it is a rebellion against ideology and the practical applications and results of that ideology 
which have not recently resulted in the sort of bloody rebellions which more readily draw 
media attention.  
Although there are many Cuban bloggers currently writing from the island on a 
variety of topics, I have chosen to focus my research on the bloggers who post through 
Voces Cubanas.  The only condition for participation is that the bloggers be Cubans 
residing in Cuba.  When the website was first launched in January, 2009 bloggers were 
also required to write using their own name rather than a pseudonym as is often the case 
of bloggers who write their dissent under the watchful eye of politically repressive 
governments.  As of this writing there are 18 bloggers linking their blogs to the site.  
They include the now world-renowned and award winning aforementioned Yoani 
Sánchez (Generación Y); her husband, an independent journalist who once wrote for the 
state, Reinaldo Escobar (Desde aquí); an imprisoned journalist, Pablo Pacheco (Voz tras 
las rejas); a photographer, Orlando Luis Pardo (Boring Home Utopics)114; and Claudia 
Cadelo (Octavo Cerco).  As Voces Cubanas is a very new creation it has gone through a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Human Rights First.  The Varela Project. Retrieved January 6, 2010 from 
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114 Pardo’s photos are beautiful and poignant and would make a very interesting focal point for research of 
a more visual nature.  Meg McLagan’s article (2006) on ‘making human rights claims public’ through the 
use of images would tie in nicely.  
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couple of incarnations already in its young life.  Up until the beginning of June 2009, the 
site served mainly as a link to the blogs with a couple of static and slightly outdated blogs 
permanently posted on the site.  Following this incarnation each bloggers’ posts were 
uploaded onto the homepage of the site as they were written.  Since this shift it is now 
possible to track these blogs daily from one central page. While this feature remains in 
place there are also now buttons on the bottom of the screen giving the reader the option 
of translating the blog into English, or linking into Facebook or Twitter. The site’s 
managers have also provided instructions for other Cuban bloggers should they want to 
add their name to growing list of participating blogs. 
The content of the blogs posted on Voces Cubanas are all political in that they are 
trying to share with the world the Cuba that they know and encounter on a daily basis 
rather than the Cuba described in state discourse.  Generally speaking, they recognize the 
disparity between the Cuba that ideally would be (or as Sánchez says “the Cuba that was 
promised to me as a girl”) and the Cuba that has come into being.  Drawing from Lynch’s 
assessment of the types of blogs in the Arab world; we can say that Sánchez and Cadelo 
are activist bloggers.  Lynch writes that Arab activist bloggers use their blogs to 
“magnify the impact of contentious politics”.115  While Sánchez may have begun her blog 
with the goal of simply communicating her version of her own reality, her blog and her 
life as a whole are now directed at drawing attention to the severe restrictions of the 
current regime and to effecting lasting change in the politics of Cuba.  Sánchez, in an 	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interview conducted by La Stampa, an Italian news service, says that had she known that 
her writing would cause so much ‘noise’ she never would have started in the first place 
but now that she’s already on the path she is committed to it and feels relieved to be able 
speak her mind after “30 years of silence.” 
Like Lynch’s Arab bloggers Sánchez, Cadelo and their fellow bloggers are utilizing 
the Internet to engage in a public discourse that is forbidden in other sectors of Cuban 
society.  They are seeking to “extend the boundaries of free speech” and to redefine how 
appropriate participation can look when real value is attached to the expression of 
critique and dissent as part of a collaborative approach to a hegemonic discourse.  Given 
the Cuban government’s restrictions on the Internet and the exchange of information 
coupled with the lack of physical infrastructure very few Cubans have the opportunity to 
read these blogs. Although Sánchez explains in a Radio Martí interview now when she 
walks down the street, Cubans recognize her whereas before she was largely unknown on 
the island.116  
One of the most appealing aspects of Voces Cubanas as a collective is the diverse 
forms of expression that take shape on the site.  For example on June 27, 2009 Orlando 
Luis Pardo Lazo posted two photographs both of elderly women in Havana; one depicts a 
woman sleeping on a sidewalk and the other a woman walking through the city.  The 
caption reads, in English, “Walking or lying. Just ladies.  Older than the city.” Just below 
his post is a link to Pacheco’s blog: on this day an audio recording of whom I presume to 	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be Pacheco talking about the health problems he has accumulated while in prison and the 
treatment he has received as a political prisoner.  The next post comes from the blog 
Desde la Habana written by Ívan García in which he comments on the ways in which the 
black market has changed under the current rule of “Castro II”, Raúl.  He writes that in 
the past the black market was the one thing in Cuba that was never broken but over the 
last year, Raúl’s increased focus on domestic concerns has resulted in a crackdown on the 
black market making it less lucrative and safe than it had been in the past.  He goes on to 
criticize the quantity of food Cubans receive with their libretas (ration books).  Finally 
Cadelo posts a blog expressing frustration with foreigners who feign to not understand 
Spanish thereby avoiding having to pay for services rendered and the government that 
has made grown men and women dependent on “2 CUC” from foreigners because they 
cannot rely on their government to adequately pay them.  She writes:  
I can’t help at times to feel a profound sense of shame for all of us: the Cubans 
‘mendingandole’117 to the foreigners who pay for work that they (the Cubans) invent, 
because the State doesn’t really pay them, and the tourists play the ingenuous victims 
that don’t understand anything. 
In an interview CubaEncuentro posted on YouTube on July 8, 2009118 Cadelo and 
Ciro Díaz, a musician in the band ‘Porno para Ricardo’ (a band which the state has 
officially prohibited) and fellow blogger, they discuss their fear of being arrested.  Both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 The word ‘mendinga’ as a noun connotes a person who is a vagabond and/or a person living outside the 
bounds of social, formal structures.  As a reflexive verb, in the above case, it means something like 
“turning themselves into” such a person. 
118 CubaEncuentra (2009, July 8). La bloguera Claudia Cadelo y el músico Ciro Díaz, voces libres desde La 
Habana.  Retrieved August 5, 2009 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AF6T8uegvMI. 
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maintain that while they feel some fear, it is the sort of fear that is manageable and that 
within the current political situation anyone could be arrested for some objective charge 
so there is little point to worrying about being arrested for dissidence rather than some 
other infraction.  “You can’t be sure of what’s going to happen.  You don’t know if 
tomorrow they’re going to take you to jail.” 
Although no disciplinary measures had been taken against these bloggers as of 
June 2009,119 the state has utilized state-sponsored websites and newspapers 
(www.cubadebate.cu and www.granma.cu) to publicly discredit Yoani Sánchez.  Sánchez 
has emerged as the most internationally recognized Cuban blogger and therefore the most 
threatening to the government.  In a CubaDebate article120 the author, Monica Montes 
Medina, claimed that Yoani Sánchez was receiving money for her blogs from the Miami 
Mafia.121  In the past the Cuban government has dealt with dissent in more direct ways.  
One method has been allowing dissenters to emigrate, as was the case in 1980 when 
Castro opened up the port of Mariel and over the course of three days over 100,000 
Cubans left the country.122  Another common method employed is that of arrest and 
intimidation.  Cuba is second only to China in the number of independent journalists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 This is, unfortunately, no longer the case. 
120 Montes-Medina, M. (2008, June 19). La conjura globalizada (The globalization conspiracy).  Retrieved 
December 10, 2008 from www.cubadebate.cu. 
121 The Miami Mafia is the term used to refer to any Cubans who have immigrated to Miami and in 
conjunction with the United States government is often referred to in official publications as the culprits of 
the economic and political situation in Cuba. 
122 Dilla, 2002. 
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serving prison sentences.  According to Reporters without Borders’ World Report 2009, 
23 independent journalists are imprisoned in Cuba, more than any other country in the 
region.123 One such independent journalist is the aforementioned Pacheco, currently 
blogging from prison.  He writes his blog occasionally with the input of other prisoners, 
passes the paper to someone visiting him who then posts the blog on the Voces Cubanas 
domain.  The fact that he is still posting indicates that the Cuban government has decided 
to allow the bloggers to speak their minds in demonstration of the socialist tendency to 
blur the lines between freedom and restriction.124    
Voices of Dissent 
While all the bloggers posting through Voces Cubanas are certainly worthy of 
independent study, I will focus on the blogs of Sánchez and Cadelo.  As I have mentioned 
above, Sánchez is the most prominent dissident blogger in Havana.  She has been 
interviewed by journalists throughout the world, has published books in both Italy and 
Brazil, has interviewed President Barack Obama via email, and has been the recipient of 
several international awards for journalism.  In 2008 she was awarded the Ortega and 
Gasset prize from the Spanish newspaper El País for digital journalism in Spanish. 
Sánchez made it onto The Time’s 2008 list of the world’s most influential people.  She 
came in under the category of “Heroes and Pioneers” along with such people as Angelina 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 (www.rsf.org). 
124 Dilla, 2002. 
59	  	  
	  
Jolie and Brad Pitt, Oprah Winfrey, and Tony Blair.125  On July 27, 2009 she received 
Columbia University’s Maria Moors Cabot prize for outstanding journalism in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  The prize is awarded to journalists in the Western 
Hemisphere who have “furthered inter-American understanding” and is the oldest 
international journalism award in the world.  Although Sánchez was not one of the three 
gold medalists, she was the only additional journalist to be “awarded a special citation”. 
Sánchez responded to the news by saying that an award from the United States will give 
her added protection (“minimal protection needed which does not mean immunity 
because in Cuba no one is immune”)126 against retribution from the Cuban government 
and a ‘combustible’ for both her own writing and for her other projects which include 
expanding the Cuban blogosphere.127    
Oscar Hijuelos, a Cuban-American write, describes Sánchez as “resourceful and 
courageous” and in possession of “a feisty dedication to the truth”.128 Phillip Penix-
Tadsen, a Spanish professor at Denison University, describes her as “an authorial 
persona” whose blog “doubtlessly derives its value and interest from a position of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 (http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/0,28757,1733748,00.html, retrieved July 9, 2009). 
126 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mlw2Lw4X060.  I believe it is worth noting here that on November 
9, Sánchez was detained and beaten by unknown assailants who seemed to have authority over local police. 
127 (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jkwzdXvSX3NiscOx32uVNB9IfEYw). 
128 Hijuelos, O. (2008). The Times 2008 100: Yoani Sánchez. Times online retrieved July 9, 2009 from 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1733748_1733756_1735878,00.html. 
(http://www.journalism.columbia.edu/cs/ContentServer/jrn/1165270052298/JRN_News_C/1212611322343
/JRNNewsDetail.htm). 
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persecution and marginality”.129  He attributes her popularity not only to her 
forthrightness and skill as a writer but to the ways in which the Cuban government has 
responded to her writing.  She has made enemies with the government; Raúl has blocked 
her blog from being accessed anywhere on the island and has reinstated restrictions on 
Cuban nationals’ Internet usage in hotels and cyber cafes. Penix-Tadsen points out that 
although there were journalists from newspapers all over the world lining up at her door 
for interviews her actual readership explosion occurred only after the Cuban government 
actively began censoring her blog on the island.  In addition to contributing to an increase 
in her notoriety, Raúl’s censor has contributed to Sánchez’ commitment to achieving 
freedom of the press in Cuba.  She has been integral in establishing Voces Cubanas and is 
primarily responsible for the creation and growth of Itinerario Blogger, a regularly held 
seminar to trouble shoot starting and maintaining a blog from Cuba.  She is also a regular 
contributor to the Huffington Post.  Despite the dangers and frustrations she faces in her 
chosen path she persists in fighting for what she believes she and all Cubans deserve. 
Claudia Cadelo is a much less dominant presence on the international scene but her 
blogs are poignant and personal.  She appeals to me as a writer for her the ways in which 
she melds heart, wit, cynicism, and weariness.  Cadelo is what Marc Masferrar refers to 
as part of a “second-generation of Cuban bloggers”, those inspired by Sánchez.  He 
describes her writing as “raw and natural and straightforward” and declares her blog a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Penix-Tadsen, P. (pending). Chapter title Islanders in the Stream: Cuban bloggers and new media at the 
margins of globalization. Columbia University. p, 32. 
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“must read” for anyone who wants to gain an understanding of Cuban reality today.130  In 
an interview with blogger Muchacho Enfermo131 of the blog My Politicophobia Cadelo 
responds to the question “Why do you think what you do is important?” by saying that 
while she is not sure whether what she does is important or not she “only want[s] to say 
what I have a right to say in a world where freedom of expression is an abstract concept, 
one might say that it’s a luxury that I afford myself: I have decided to be a free being”.132  
Cadelo is also the 2009 recipient of an island based Cuban blogger award issued by 
Itinerario Blogger. 
Both women write on a variety of issues present in Cuba from social control 
mechanisms such as travel restrictions and state sponsored propaganda to economic 
issues such as the dual currency and low state salaries.  They write of friendships and 
internal struggles; of walls and breeches.  What these writers want is a voice; a voice that 
can be heard throughout Cuba, a voice that informs the discourse of the State, and a voice 
that is joined by those of other Cubans. 
Internet and Cyberactivism 
Although Raúl promised to lift the ban on Cubans entering hotel Internet cafes he 
has yet to follow through on it and Cubans are still denied access.   The execution of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Masferrer, M. (2009). http://marcmasferrer.typepad.com/uncommon_sense/2009/10/meet-cuban-
blogger-claudia-cadelo-cuba.html. 
131 Muchacho Enfermo (2009, March 1). Interview with Claudia Cadelo.  Retrieved December 20, 2009 
from http://mypoliticophobia.blogspot.com/2009/03/interview-with-claudia-cadelo.html. 
132Ibid.  
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ban is poignantly illustrated in a video Sánchez posted on her blog on May 10, 2009, now 
available through YouTube133 in which her husband and fellow blogger Reinaldo 
Escobar, requests access to a computer in Hotel Melia Cohíba while Sánchez films the 
conversation from behind a newspaper.  He is informed that access is only available to 
foreigners: 
Hotel employee: No, no I can’t sell you an hour of Internet, because the connection 
here is only for foreigners. 
Reinaldo: I’m sorry, I don’t hear well. 
Employee: The connection here is only for foreigners. 
Reinaldo: Since when? 
Employee: It’s been a month. 
Reinaldo: I came a week ago and was able to connect. 
Employee: There was a resolution that says that it’s only for foreigners.  Look here… 
It’s happening in all of the hotels… It’s a resolution from MINTUR (the Ministry of 
Tourism) 
Reinaldo then reminds the employee that the Cuban constitution opposes discrimination 
on the basis of national origin and points out that no one in Mexico would ever say “this 
is available to everyone in the world except Mexicans”.  In May of 2009 Radio Martí 
conducted a five part series on Cuban bloggers.  These include interviews with Yoani 
Sánchez, Claudia Cadelo, and Reinaldo Escobar and focus on issues of access to the 
Internet and the newly re-enforced restrictions on Cuban nationals’ Internet usage.  In an 
interview on May 12, 2009134 Escobar further explains that to limit the Internet to 
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134 Radio Martí (2009, May 12). Confirman con un video las restricciones a Internet en Cuba (They confirm 
the restrictions on Internet in Cuba with a video).  Retrieved August 10, 2009 from 
http://www.martinoticias.com/fullstory.aspx?id=F04C643D-5239-4AEE-AAC020FBF1A7E40B. 
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someone because of their political opinions is a completely different beast than limiting 
the internet based on national origin.  
In June of 2009 Iran held an election widely decried as rigged and therefore 
invalid.  Angry Iranians in support of losing opposition candidates poured into the streets 
to protest to results.  They flooded Twitter with posts of violence, blocked 
communication, and organizational strategies and blogs revealed the extent of the Iranian 
populations frustration with the government’s methods of social and political control.  
From Cuba, Sánchez and Cadelo followed the events closely.  
 Cadelo, June 15, writes that while there are important differences between the 
blogger communities in Iran and Cuba, namely the disparate levels of available 
technology, there exist compelling similarities.  She writes: “But one thing connects me 
to those far off bloggers, as if the cable that connects me to the Internet already exists in 
my head, they, like me, are young and dream of three things: HUMAN RIGHTS, 
LIBERTY AND CHANGE.”  She goes on to describe the way Cuban news sources 
portrayed the election in Iran showing only those crowds who supported President 
Ahmadinejad.  She knew immediately that it was a lie.  Cadelo writes that Cuban 
television is “a game of enigmas, you have to read between the lines, negate concepts, 
turn around puzzles, doubt in every instant…”  She speculates that were Cuban politics 
ever addressed on Iranian news programs reporters would depict a population in complete 
support of their ‘president’ ready to give their lives over for la revolución.  “But from my 
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little blog I send my solidarity and my admiration, we are much fewer, but we are also 
here on the net and they give us strength”. 
Sánchez, June 17, echoes Cadelo’s solidarity and voices her frustration at not being 
able to follow what is happening in Iran on the Internet and displeasure that Cuban news 
sources said nothing of people’s faces painted green and the mass movement of Iranians 
utilizing social networking sites to express their own frustration and communicate their 
situation with the rest of the world.  She writes:  
I envision a generation sick of old structures that wants change, a people – like me – 
who have stopped believing in enlightened leaders who guide us like a herd… If there 
is still time to give my solidarity to the Iranian bloggers, well here is a post to tell 
them: “Today it is you, tomorrow it could be us”.  
Language of Propaganda and La Patria 
Given the amount of energy the State and Fidel in particular have placed in 
creating and perpetuating a discourse which thrives upon a binary world of good (Cuba) 
and evil (capitalism and its poster child, the United States) it is not surprising that this 
dualism is a topic upon which both Cadelo and Sánchez have dwelt.  Sánchez, June 4, 
reminisces of when she was 14 years old (1989) and had learned of Poland’s working 
class rebellion against the USSR.  She, her parents, and many other Cubans felt at that 
moment a profound sense of having been betrayed.  Sánchez then felt for the first time 
that everything “they had instilled in me was perhaps not true”.  Now Sánchez’ son is 14 
years old.  In school he repeats the phrase “pioneers for communism, we will be like 
Ché” and Sánchez wonders when he will realize that he’s been fed lies as well. 
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Sánchez, June 20, posted a blog written by Cadelo on Sánchez’ Huffington Post blog 
spot.  Cadelo writes of what she thinks is the “most extreme poster” she has seen in 
which the State pushes its “Battle of Ideas”.  In this case the poster is entitled “The 
Fighting Philosophy of Our People” and is composed of a list of 10 important 
revolutionary tips including:  
- “To cause the greatest possible number of casualties on the active enemy forces 
is our main goal.”  
- and “Keep the fighting spirit, for huge and painful sacrifices are required to win 
the day.” 
 
Cadelo muses as to who this enemy is with whom Cuba is locked in war, for clearly 
the poster indicates that Cuba is at war.  She asks, “where does it come from, the 
philosophy that tells me that I, as a citizen, must destroy, kill, annihilate, sacrifice, die, 
command, direct and obey?”  She expresses disappointment in the State’s continuing 
reliance on the tactics of the original regime and the idea of the “New Man” pointing out 
that these “new” reforms have already been proven to be failures.135  Cadelo also 
expresses disappointment in her fellow Cubans who swallow the propaganda and act as if 
such posters reflect a reality they experience.  
Similarly Sánchez writes on June 29 of the ever-agreeing bobbleheads nodding ‘yes’ 
whenever the car to which they are attached passes over uneven ground.  She compares 
the bobbleheads to Cubans at large writing “the sport of saying ‘yes’ has resulted in too 
many lost souls of my generation, who are burdened with the weight of the consequences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yoani-sanchez/claudia-cadelo-is-cuba-at_b_218473.html 
66	  	  
	  
of assent and the compromises our parents have made”.  In typically clear and direct 
language, Sánchez goes on to write:  
We could begin by saying ‘no’ to centralism, bureaucracy, the cult of personality, 
absurd prohibitions and gerontocracy.  Like a fan that rotates from right to left, this is 
how I would move if someone consulted me on the question of the actual 
government.  ‘No’ is the first word that pops into my head when someone asks me if 
the Cuba of today is anything like what was promised to me as a girl.  My 
disapprobation will not be transmitted on t.v., nor will the little complacent applause 
of some boss be worth much to me but at least it is not automatic like the ‘yes’ of the 
little plastic dog that sticks its head out from behind the windshield. 
Her frustration with Castro’s Cuba is apparent but more importantly what she is voicing 
here is frustration with her fellow Cubans for the apathy, and perhaps the submission, 
they demonstrate in the face of the existing disparities and injustices.   
While many Cubans are looking toward the new Obama administration with hope to 
advance trade, travel, and communication between the two nations Fidel continues to 
make reference to Cuba’s constant “resistance … to the most potent imperialist power in 
history”136 and the tension between the Cuban State and Cuban-Americans continues to 
cause ripples on both sides of the narrow water that divides the two nations.   
On June 4, 2009 the Organization of American States convened in San Pedro 
Sula, Honduras and made the historic announcement that Cuba, despite the objection of 
the United States137, would finally be invited to join the table of OAS.  The Cuban journal 
Juventud Rebelde described this as a symbol of the collective rebellion of Latin American 
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http://www.granma.cu/espanol/2009/octubre/mar27/carta.html retrieved October 27, 2009. 
137 largely influenced by the Cuban-American lobby who oppose Cuba’s human rights record 
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states against the power of the United States of America.  Fidel admits that this is an 
important step in the right direction but that Cuba refrains from accepting the offer 
because, while Cuba desires peace and respects international cooperation, it “has been, is, 
and will be intransigent in the defense of its principles”.138  Sánchez, June 5, is quick to 
offer biting criticism of Cuba’s decision to remain aloof from the OAS.  The invitation 
from the OAS put the Castro regime into what Sánchez sees as a familiar predicament 
that always ends badly; “to hide between belligerence and harmony”.  Harmony “burns 
them like salt of the skin and drowns them like water in the lungs”.  Accepting a position 
of harmony would directly contradict what Sánchez refers to as “the logic of 
confrontation” the government has forged and within which it “feels so comfortable”.  
She sees this as yet another door opening for the people of Cuba and yet another 
opportunity for the government to demonstrate its unwillingness to accept the help and 
cooperation of other nations.  She writes: 
And so it seems that those who control the helm of my country prefer the sticky 
slogan “With the OAS or without the OAS, we will win the fight” that they yelled in 
the 60s.  Notwithstanding, now no one can see the battle on any side, the enemy has 
become blurred and the victory… ay the victory… has been reduced to maintaining 
power all this time. 
Sánchez calls the Castro regime out for yet again forfeiting the good of the people in 
favor of the perpetuation of a myth. 
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Zweiland is a play based on the struggle of two people in East Berlin to overcome 
the obstacles established with the construction of the Berlin wall, to fight in order to buy, 
to love, to survive.  Sánchez attended the play at the Gran Teatro in Havana on June 2.  
She saw an incredible amount of resonance between the struggles of the people in the 
play and those of Cubans today.  One of the features of the characters in the play that 
most stood out to her was their ability, or tendency, to forget about the “threatening 
shadow” hovering over them and to “find refuge in intimacy, to dedicate almost all of 
oneself to surviving”.  She writes: 
If only our wall were like theirs: of stone, cement and wire, we could take a hammer 
and a pick to tear it down.  If only we could touch it and say “here it begins, here it 
ends” I am sure that we would have already brought it down.  Nonetheless, this 
barrier that separates us from so many things is –in our case- intangible and 
reinforced by the sea.  If for one moment this wall of controls and prohibitions that 
surrounds us materialized, there would be hilarious graffiti all over it.  People would 
bring a ladder in order to see to the other side –just as the dance did Friday night- or 
they would try to dig a hole in its hard foundation.  If none of that worked, they 
would take an abundant and defiant piss against the cold structure.  
In her June 30 blog post Sánchez writes of leadership, thoughts provoked by the events in 
Honduras at the time.  She writes of her evolving awareness of the power dynamics 
associated with leadership.  She had thought that dictators were a dying breed and that 
democracy was making progress but has since become more skeptical.  She opens the 
blog by referring to democracy as a fragile plant (pictured is a small plant growing out of 
what appears to be a gutter above a porch roof) that must be tended carefully for its roots 
are easily unmoored.  After musing on the comparative evils of dictatorship over military 
control she ends the blog by writing the following:  “Careful! Within the wide range that 
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dictators inhabit, the worst combination is when these converge -into one person- the 
figure of caudillo and of armed gorilla.” Her choice of words here is important.  I 
intentionally left the word caudillo untranslated because, although it translates as leader, 
it is also a name often used to refer to Franco and therefore implies a more weighty 
meaning than the simple translation of leader would do.  Gorila means both ‘gorilla’ and 
‘bodyguard’ and in both languages invokes an image, when used to refer to a person, of 
someone with a lot of brute force and a very short fuse.  
In her June 10 and 12 posts Cadelo addresses censorship.  She notes that MSN 
(Hotmail) are no longer accessible in Cuba and that Facebook’s Declaration of Rights 
and Responsibilities states that anyone living in a nation under a U.S. embargo is not to 
utilize the site.139  On June 12 she posts an interview she conducted with a Cuban living 
in China.  The individual informs Cadelo that in China the government is blocking more 
and more sites across the country.  He/she thought at first that when he/she could not 
open YouTube it was simply because YouTube was experiencing difficulties.  He/she 
shortly became aware that MSN/Hotmail had been blocked and that Octavo Cerco, 
Cadelo’s own blog, was banned from Chinese Internet. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Perhaps in June this was the case, but as of this writing the pertinent item in Facebook’s Declaration of 
Rights and Responsibilities (16.2.) reads as follows: “If you are located in a country emgargoed by the 
United States, or are on the U.S. Department’s list of Specially Designated Nationals you will not engage in 
commercial activities on Facebook (such as advertising or payments) or operate a Platform application or 
website.” www.facebook.com/terms.php 
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Participation as Social Control 
The State might hope that it has accomplished a certain level of collective 
autonomy and fraternity, but members of its Young Communist association have taken 
the calls for civic participation in a new and interesting direction.  On June 29, Cadelo 
writes that a group of youth attempted to break into her friend’s car.  She admits that car 
theft and “amputations” are now so common that people rarely leave their car radios 
inside their cars when they park, whether there is a parking attendant or not.  On this 
particular occasion before the youths had a chance to effectively break into the car, 
neighbors of the car’s owner “raised the alarm” and the perpetrators fled.  Only then did 
these witnesses see that the car had a blue license plate; an indication that it is a State 
vehicle.  Upon reporting the attempted crime Cadelo’s friend was informed that the car 
belonged to the headquarters of the Union of Young Communists, a political youth 
organization focused on volunteerism and militarization. 
The lines between civic participation and social control in Cuba seem blurred at best, 
if not overlapping.  While artists in Cuba may experience less censorship than journalists 
and bloggers enjoy140 this “degree of freedom” in the process of discourse development is 
on occasion tempered by the State’s control over social spaces and artistic participation.  
Cadelo writes of such an experience.  On June 9, 2009141 a famous Mexican band, Café 
Tacuba, performed in Havana’s Plaza de La Revolución in front of the U.S. interests 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Fernandes. 
141 Cadelo (2009, June 17). 
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building.  The concert was an officially organized event and though many people, 
including Cadelo, felt a bit cheated that rather than have a vantage point which included 
the band itself, all they could see was the banner which reads “Todo por la Revolución”, 
the black flags lined up behind the banner, and the flashing red letters of the U.S. interest 
building.  On a night when Cadelo did not particularly want to be reminded of the 
political climate under which she lives, events made a turn for the worse.  At the end of 
the night Cuban police began to clear the plaza by pushing and yelling at attendants.  
Cadelo tells of standing on a platform refusing to move when she hears “10 whistles at 
my back”.  She turns around and says to the whistle blowers “I am not going to ask for 
the reasons behind why I have to leave, but since you’re going to kick me out, at least 
have the decency to not treat me like a cow.”  She was then approached by three police 
officers who informed her that it did not matter how she left, whether “by whistle or by 
force” but that she had to leave.  To these officers she replied “Are they paying you to 
kick me out? No? Then the time you are passing here is covered by your salary, it is not 
my fault if this is slow work, if you ask me nicely to leave I will go, if you whistle at me 
again, I’m staying”.   
At the end of the 2008, responding to an increase in the number of assaults on 
passengers and bus drivers in the middle of the night, the State assigned police officers to 
bus routes during the most dangerous hours.  On June 23, 2009 Cadelo recounts the 
experiences of her friend, Rolando, one night on a bus with his daughter.  Cadelo writes 
that while her first inclination was to think of this new policy as reassuring she reminded 
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herself that “what happens is that in Cuba civil order and military discipline are 
synonomous”.  In addition to preventing assaults the police effectively banned playing 
music as well, as had been the custom.  On this particular night in December a group of 
young people just leaving the clubs boarded a bus and began to play reggaetón music.  
Little did they know that there were two armed plain-clothes police officers on the bus as 
well.  Without identifying themselves they began fighting with the rebel music players.  
Cadelo reports that panic ensued, in the full bus, the officers (now identified) ordered the 
driver to stop the bus but to keep the doors closed.  The occupants frantically tried to exit 
the bus and disappear in to the dark streets but one of the officers “took out his gun and 
fired inside the bus, several times”.  She describes the next moments as follows: 
The terror was uncontrollable, people jumped out of the small windows and finally 
they opened the doors and everyone tried to leave at the same time.  Rolando got his 
daughter out of the bus first and when his feet touched the asphalt he felt a searing 
pain in his left leg and fainted. 
Rolando had been shot through his thigh.  The offending officers experienced no negative 
consequences or penalties for their extreme behavior.  Cadelo writes that days later an 
article published in Granma praised the new bus security measures and the officers who 
were contributing to maintaining civil order.  Cadelo concludes her post writing that after 
Rolando’s experience “he is convince of just on thing: he, and all of us, are unprotected 
in this country.” 
 Cadelo, June 6, again recounts the experience of a friend, Ciro, on a bus, this time 
returning from a camping vacation outside of the city.  She reports on the solidarity a 
group of Cuban passengers displays when two police officers wrongly arrested the bus 
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driver.  Before the police had the chance to drive off with the driver in the car, the 
passengers descended on the car, removing the driver “under the noses of the officers” 
who didn’t wait to confront “the beach mob” and did “what was most reasonable: they 
fled.”  With the driver liberated, his story told, and the bus back on the road, every 
passenger signed a letter of witness with both their full names and their identification 
numbers.  They presented him with both their signatures and pictures of the events should 
he find use for them in his defense.  She concludes the post by writing: 
They arrived a little later than planned, but they all felt proud, sure that the driver 
could say that this was the best trip of his life. 
In the absence of a system of civic participation in which citizens feel that truly 
agentic in the development of hegemonic discourse, some see the emigration as the only 
viable alternative.  In her typical poignant and personal way Cadelo (July 22) makes it 
clear that she finds it unacceptable that Cubans have the choice of living under 
totalitarianism or of emigrating and living the life of an invisible immigrant.  She writes 
“I see all around me that to leave the country is the Cuban dream”.  In addition to venting 
her frustration that emigration is perceived not “as an option, but as an exit” she wonders 
when the Cuban government will begin to take responsibility for dividing Cubans 
between those who stay on the island and those who jump for the nearest exit.  Perhaps 
Cadelo would agree with Kramer (see below) that the ‘option’ to stay in a totalitarian 
country or to flee to another is not an element of freedom at all, but rather one of 
oppression and another symptom of totalitarian rule.  Sánchez has also often mentioned 
her frustration with the limitations placed on Cubans who wish to leave the country.  She 
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has many times been invited to participate in international conferences and to receive 
awards for her writing yet she has been denied permission to travel outside of the country 
each time she has petitioned the government.142  
In an example of what seems possibly a more passive form of censorship and/or 
surveillance, Cadelo’s phone was, all of a sudden, disconnected.  On June 4 she writes 
that employees at Etecsa, the Cuban telephone company, informed her that by some 
“unknown error someone ordered her phone be disconnected.”  The phone line was 
reconnected only to suffer the same fate repeatedly and to finally settle into a 
temperamental compromise between the extremes of connected and disconnected.  She 
informs her readers, with regret, that each week at Etecsa offices throughout the city, 
State Security officials take over, giving the employees an out-of-office respite for a 
couple of hours.  She writes; “they (the beings without faces) do their work (no one 
knows what it is), thank the workers for their collaboration, verbally of course, and then 
leave”. 
At a point in her life when she knew less about politics, Cadelo decided to “find 
out how many opposition parties there were in Cuba… and to become a member of 
each.”  She discovered that things were not so simple as she had thought.  Even in the 
opposition parties she found that there was no room for someone as oppositional as she.  
It is for this reason, more than any other, that she began to write her blog.  She wanted “to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 In Sánchez’ October 15th post she includes a video of her most recent attempt to convince the 
government to allow her to leave the country.  She engages in quite a debate with the officials present. 
Cantarles las cuarenta (Sing to them the 40s). Retrieved October 17, 2009 from 
http://www.desdecuba.com/generaciony/?p=2268. 
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be able to be part of All that exists to exact Change in the Cuban government (peacefully, 
of course).  She writes of manifestations put together by opposing groups making 
demands on the government.  These manifestations tend to be ineffective in part because 
they are inconsistently delivered.  She suggests that if the Cuban bloggers are going to 
present a manifestation that it should be repeated every week, every month until their 
objectives are met.  She concludes by writing that “had anyone asked [her], [her] 
demands would have been: 
- Renounce, in full, the President of States and Ministers [Raúl Castro] and the 
National Assembly 
- Constitution of a State of Rights and preparation for free elections, with all 
parties participating 
- Sour the Secret Services and public burden and government structures related to 
the communist party. 
 
Liberty and the idea of freedom can be viewed as comparative.  An individual or a 
society compares his/her own freedom and liberty with that of a different individual or 
society.  Matthew H. Kramer (2002)143 argues that there are no degrees of freedom; that 
one either is or is not free to do a particular thing.  There is no such thing as partial 
freedom.  He distinguishes between particular and overall liberty indicating that the lack 
of degrees of freedom is something that applies exclusively to particular freedoms rather 
than an overall sense of liberty.  Some theorists contend that when there are bureaucratic 
hurdles involved in attaining something considered an element of freedom, such as the 
State’s permission for an individual to leave Cuba, the hassle diminishes the freedom 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143Kramer, M.H. (2002). Why freedoms do not exist by degrees. Political Studies 50, 230-243. 
  
76	  	  
	  
itself.  The author suggests that in fact, such hurdles as bureaucracy and taxes render the 
desired thing no longer a freedom when the creation of these obstacles was intended to 
deter individuals from seeking the given objective.  In the case of Cubans being restricted 
from leaving their country without their government’s permission, Kramer would 
respond that leaving the country for Cubans is not an element of their freedom at all, as 
distinguished from being an element of freedom merely diminished by bureaucracy. 
While Kramer, and perhaps Cadelo, views these sorts of physical barriers as limits to 
freedom, María Caridad Campistrous, proffers an alternate perspective.  To Campistrous 
freedom (liberty) can be viewed as either a physical state or a mental state.  When one 
views oneself as mentally free, or at liberty, then the importance or strength of physical 
limitations diminishes.  While perhaps not entirely in agreement with Campistrous, 
Sánchez comments that while the Cuban government uses the power of who can and 
cannot exit or enter the country to imprison certain individuals within the boundaries of 
the island, either for crimes of the past or for crimes yet to be committed (as is the case in 
the government’s denial of Sánchez’ exit visa) freedom is something relative.  She writes 
that “one must not store their resentment against their prison guards for they also are 
prisoners today of their power, their fear, and nearness of their inevitable demise”.144  
Echoing Cadelo’s above-mentioned contention, Sánchez notes the ways in which the 
Cuban government’s actions are dividing families and damaging their very souls.  The 
1,689th commenter, Amaraluna, on this particular post points out that while the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Sánchez (2009, June 14). 
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government may claim to be socialist and to act in the best interest of all Cubans, there 
are blatant exceptions that make such claim farce.   
Dual Economy 
A dominant theme in Cuban alternative discourse is what has been referred to as a 
system of ‘tourism apartheid”.145  As discussed in the earlier section on Cuba’s dual 
economy, economic hardships have presented the State with the need to perform a 
challenging balancing act of developing a market based tourism sector while perpetuating 
a local socialist structure.  The State’s solution has often been to separate Cubans from 
tourists and to forbid Cubans from certain privileges such as staying in hotels, visiting 
certain beaches, and using Internet cafes.  
While the government claims to be working towards the most just and equitable 
society on earth, Cuban bloggers such as Sánchez and Cadelo see priorities that involve 
catering to tourists while discriminating against Cubans.  Sánchez’ June 19th blog 
comments on the now decrepit Calle de San Lazarus pointing out that while buildings in 
the tourist districts of Havana are being renovated, buildings on streets such as this, 
lacking the “magic of the Malecón” and with thousands of people hidden behind their 
“unpainted façades” will be allowed to crumble to the ground.146   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Google search results in several blog citations including 
http://dir.salon.com/story/people/feature/2002/02/06/cuba_apart/.   
146 Having seen the “magic” of the Malecón, which includes numerous buildings in various states of 
decrepitude, I speculate that Sánchez is being a touch dramatic here but the drama helps to illustrate her 
point, which I believe is valid. 
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Sánchez, June 3, writes that the state salary is nothing more than a symbol and is 
“insufficient everywhere”.  She contends that what really makes people both apply for 
custodial and security jobs and continue to work at their jobs once they have been hired is 
the snack.  The snack typically consists of a little sandwich of ham and cheese and a 
soda.  She writes that without the money from reselling the snack many of these workers 
would have abandoned their posts long ago.  This begs the question, what kind of a just 
society would make the salaries of full-time employees so meager that selling a small 
sandwich and a soda would make the difference between a job being worth the effort or 
not?   
On June 11, the BBC’s Havana correspondent, Fernando Ravsberg, published a 
blog on the economic reality of Cuba.  He took issue with the claim that Cubans, in 
general, live in poverty pointing out that 50% of Cubans receive money from abroad or 
through means beyond their official salaries.  He reports that there are Cuban millionaires 
and that even rural tobacco farmers can make a lot of money if they work within the right 
markets.  Ravsberg writes that “hundreds of thousands of Cubans are middle class 
citizens”.  There is a considerable body of evidence that Cuban classes exist and are 
increasingly more noticeable but given the ideological proclivities of the Cuban State the 
existence of a class structure serves perhaps as a slap in the face to those Cubans who 
abide by the rules in place yet suffer the greatest economic ramifications.  But more 
important is Cadelo’s response (June 14) to Ravsberg’s blog.  She will not “enumerate 
the many cases of absurd misery that I see from my apartment in Vedado every day, of 
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the numerous friends I have living in poverty, of the dining room of the destitute that I 
have in the corner of my house and much less of my own needs”.  What she will do and 
does is to ask where these wealthy Cubans are?  Where are the Cubans “who do not ride 
in guaguas (buses)”, or in trains, or who able to rent rooms in hotels?  Cadelo argues that 
while poverty is a reality for a majority of Cubans the real poverty is found in the ways in 
which Cubans’ freedom has been limited.  She writes of Cubans as a people who: 
…do not have the right to dissent, who do not have free elections, who do not have 
political rights, who do not have freedom of the press…, who need a “Yuma” 
(American) to assume/accept economic projects, who are not allowed to move freely 
throughout national territory…, who cannot change the government of their country, 
who have only one party, who cannot NOT be pioneers, who cannot, in the end, do 
with their money as they please. 
As if she were not clear enough throughout the body of her blog, she wraps it up saying 
that really, the impoverished are also foreign correspondents “who live in the paradox of 
having to write news or of having to give up being journalists”.  
One of many ways of tapping into the tourist market is to rent out rooms in one’s 
house to foreigners.  These are called “casas particulares” and allow Cubans an 
opportunity to earn a living from which they receive CUC.  Cadelo writes on June 25 that 
while this is a very easy and effective way of moving beyond “measuring kilos to pay the 
light bill” the financial security it beings comes at a cost.  The Cuban government is 
uncomfortable with Cubans interacting with foreigners and so in the case of the “casas 
particulares” the state makes sure that they are running as they want.  Cadelo explains 
that inspectors arrive every day to ensure that the names of all of the guests have been 
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noted, that their identification numbers are recorded, that the number of people allowed 
per room has not been exceeded, that their stays have not been less than 24 hours, etc.  In 
addition to musing as to the logic behind the unofficial prohibitions of Cubans freely 
associating with foreigners she explains that when in such situations a visiting tourist is 
less than honorable, there is no recourse for his offense.  
While children sit in school rooms learning how they too can be like the heroes of 
the Revolution, sacrificing personal gain for the greater good, many of their parents are 
earning all or part of their money participating in illicit activities.  Sánchez, June 20, 
writes that this sort of behavior is now pervasive in Cuban society.  From the person who 
steals the backpack of a tourist to the customs agent who allows illegal goods past to the 
police officer who does not issue a fine; Cuban society and the Cuban government is rife 
with corruption and unofficially sanctioned illicit behavior.  “With the resulting profits of 
these “misdemeanors” the walls of the bubble that protect the discourse are strengthened, 
but also they dissuade anyone from protesting publicly”. 
Education  
As I described earlier, Guevara’s concept of the new social man is something that 
still plays into the Cuban curriculum and influences the way children think of the country 
itself.  Schools are one of the primary settings for broadcasting the State’s master 
discourse model but while teaching children the value of socialist principles, the ideology 
of the revolution, and to be vigilant of the constant threat of el imperio, children are also 
learning the value of critical thinking, literacy, and other valuable skills in being able to 
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understand and formulate their own discourse models some of which run counter to the 
hegemonic discourse of the State.   
Unfortunately what the bloggers and writers such as Hernandez, Aguirre, and 
Corbett see as Cubans’ apathy is an indication both of the ineffectiveness of State 
officiated modes of participation and school transmitted propaganda as well as the State’s 
effectiveness in eliminating a sense of agency and autonomy within its citizens.  While 
international academics and researchers are busy praising Cuba for its educational 
achievements Sánchez decries the state of Cuban education in her June 16th blog on 
proper orthography.  She notes that several students in secondary school spell the name 
“Quijote” with a “K” and confuse “s” and “c” when writing.  Spanish is a phonetic 
language and therefore, perhaps, spelling errors are less forgivable.  While the 
misspelling of the name “Quijote” is a grave offense, because a) the letter “k” is so rarely 
used in Spanish and b) the name itself is “a symbol of our Spanishness” what offends 
Sánchez less is the misspelling of the word “civil”.  One student with whom she worked 
spelled the word “síbir”.  This student is excused because, as Sánchez writes, “in this case 
one can understand, because the concept is so little known in this society where citizens 
are considered soldiers and not beings with rights.”   
Cadelo, June 8, writes of a 15 year old boy who believes that he has discovered 
the key to success in Cuba.  He serves as the president of the Student Federation of 
Middle Schools (Federación Estudiantil de la Enseñanza Media) despite the fact that he 
does not care “un pepino” about the ideology.  His presidency affords him the right to 
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skip school and exams and is an automatic entrance pass to university.  While the system 
will enable his aloofness from learning until then, and feed his thirst for “the honey of 
power” Cadelo laments for him.  She writes that he will discover in university that he is 
unprepared for everything.  “He has no idea of the sadness and faint-heartedness that can 
come from Living in Lies.”  Although he is “a good boy” one day in “his fragmented path 
to the top he will forget his true fate and become a fool and an opportunist.” 
Sánchez and Cadelo are highly critical of the Cuban government and of the 
apathy of their fellow Cubans.  But I think it is also obvious that they feel a sense of 
commitment to the future of Cuba and Cubans.  They do not reject the idea of la Patria, 
they reject the physical and ideological restrictions the State places on their lives.  While 
the government actively takes measures to limit Sánchez, Cadelo and other bloggers’ 
circle of influence, the existence and the force of these counterhegemonic discourses are 
having and will continue to have lasting impacts on State discourse. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Revolutionary Parallels 
Their impotence came not from their vices but from their servitude; and their 
vices, on the other hand, were born from their impotence. 
 Sartre 
There are intriguing parallels between the beginnings of the revolution in 1956 
and the current blogger movement.  In 1956, according to Sartre, the average Cuban 
peasant was unaware of his/her “reality.”  They had grown complacent with a discourse 
model that involved a rigid hierarchy in which the peasantry were relied on for their 
agricultural production but were excluded from society not only because of geographic 
isolation but because they were unaware that life could be different.  Sartre writes that the 
most successful component of the rebels’ earliest efforts was their ability to show the 
peasants both what it meant to be respected and how disposable they were to the 
government.  Through their actions (which included working side by side with the 
peasants) the rebels helped the peasantry “become aware of its servitude…” (p. 19). 
Similarly, Cuban bloggers are seeking to help other Cubans become more aware 
of the limitations the government has placed on their freedoms.  Although their ability to 
reach out to an island based Cuban audience is limited it does seem that effecting lasting 
and liberating change in Cuba is their dominant goal.  In a blog posted on July 15, 2009 
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Miriam Celaya147 writes to her fellow bloggers on Voces Cubanas expressing gratitude 
that they all have a place in which they can write without being censured.  She writes:  
This is another space –of those in the blogosphere to which we are permitted total 
access- where we can discuss everything that has been prohibited to us, that they have 
hidden from us, that they want us to forget. 
She goes on to urge other Cubans to read the blogs posted on Voces Cubanas before the 
government restricts island access to it as it has done with www.desdecuba.com, the 
domain for Generación Y.  Celaya writes that “there is no virus more contagious than 
liberty (No hay virus más contagioso que la libertad)” a sentiment shared by 
revolutionaries like Guevara and Castro 50 years ago when they set out to liberate 
Cubans from Batista’s rigid class structure.  She informs her readers that while many of 
her compatriots do not have access to the liberating influence of the blogs via the 
Internet, she and other bloggers share their posts through the use of cds and flash drives. 
6 weeks after Celaya posted this blog on Voces Cubanas, the Cuban government finally 
(after 8 months of uncensored blogging) restricted access to the aggregator site, and all 
included sites, on August 28, 2009.  
Sartre (1961)148 asks how men with good intentions can later turn out to be 
corruptible.  He writes: 
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No one asked himself then, why, in 1933 and in 1944, men who had in the beginning 
been honest and rebellious in the face of the corruption of the rest, had let themselves 
in turn be corrupted little by little, and ended by betraying the country. 
One could easily replace the dates 1933 and 1944 with that of 1959 and wonder aloud 
when the Castro regime became more concerned with maintaining power than in doing 
what is best for the people as it seemed sincere, according to Sartre, about accomplishing 
at the beginning of la revolución.   
 Perhaps the Cuban State should entertain the possibility that these bloggers, rather 
than being a threat to the established order are a product of an ideology that preaches 
justice and a history of revolutionaries.  They may then see that while Castro and his 
vanguard used violence to overthrow a violent, repressive regime, these Cuban 
revolutionaries are using words and ideas to overthrow a regime that maintains its hold 
through the use of words and ideas.  They would perhaps see, that the defiant spirit 
Sánchez and Cadelo display day in and day out is the same defiant spirit that pushed 
Castro to force change in the same country half a century ago.  Regardless of the 
consequences, these writers are committed to living free lives and to spreading that 
freedom throughout their island, altering the face of discourse and participation in the 
process.   
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APPENDIX A 
AN EXCERPT FROM ERNESTO CHE GUEVARA’S “SOCIALISM AND MAN IN 
CUBA” 
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An excerpt from Ernesto Ché Guevara’s “Socialism and Man in Cuba”: 
Allow me to attempt to come to some conclusions: 
We socialists are more free because we are more fulfilled; we are more fulfilled because 
we are more free. 
The skeleton of our freedom is formed, but it lacks the protein substance and the 
draperies; we shall create them. 
Our freedom and its daily sustenance are the color of blood and are swollen with 
sacrifice. 
Our sacrifice in a conscious one; it is the payment for the freedom we are constructing. 
The road is long and unknown in part; we are aware of our limitations.  We shall make 
the twenty-first-century man, we ourselves. 
We shall be forged in daily action, creating a new man with a new technology. 
The personality plays the role of mobilization and leadership insofar as it incarnates the 
highest virtues and aspirations of the people and is not detoured. 
The road is opened up by the vanguard group, the best among the good, the party. 
The fundamental clay of our work is the youth; in it we have deposited our hopes and we 
are preparing it to take the banner from our hands.   	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POR ESO DECIMOS ¡PATRIA O MUERTE! 	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Por eso decimos ¡Patria o Muerte!1 
Podremos morir, si, pero claudicar 
jamás… 
Sin Patria no queremos la vida 
Sin dignidad no queremos la vida… 
Sin justicia no queremos la vida… 
Sin pan para nuestros hijos no queremos 
la vida… 
Sin porvenir no queremos la vida… 
Podremos morir, 
No porque despreciemos la vida, 
No porque despreciemos la obra 
creadora que nuestro pueblo 
realiza, 
No porque no vemos el porvenir 
luminoso a que tenemos derecho 
con nuestro trabajo 
Sino porque la vida do todos nosotros 
esta indisolublemente ligada a 
esa idea y ese porvenir 
Y por eso decimos ¡Patria o Muerte! 
Y por eso, 
Por eso el himna de nuestros luchadores 
por la independencia estableció 
bien claro  
Que vivir en cadenas era vivir en 
oprobios y aprenda sumidas,  
Y que morir por la 
 Patria es vivir. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This poem was painted on an interior wall of a 
semi-abandoned building I came across in 
Havana, Cuba 
And so we say, Patria or Death! 
We could die, yes, but never give in… 
Without the Patria we don’t want life… 
Without dignity we don’t want life… 
Without justice we don’t want life… 
Without bread for our children we don’t 
want life… 
Without a future we don’t want life… 
We could die,  
but not because we despise life, 
but not because we despise the formative 
work that our people have 
realized, 
but not because we don’t see a luminous 
future to which we have a right 
with our work 
But because the life of all of us is 
indelibly tied to that idea and that 
future 
 
And so we say, Patria or Death! 
And so, 
And so our freedom fighters’ hymn 
made very clear 
 
That to live in chains was to live in 
shame and [aprenda sumida],2 
And that to die for the  
Patria is to live 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ‘aprenda’ means learning or knowledge and 
‘sumida’ means submerged in vice – I can’t 
seem to come up with a good succinct translation 
for that sentiment 
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